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1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing number of transnational investment
transactions worldwide, many countries have signed different
international investment agreements (IIAs), bilateral or multilateral,
with other countries to stimulate market openness and attract more
foreign direct investments (FDI) to improve their economies.1 These
terms contain obligations. National security is one of the exceptions
that exempts states from the obligations assumed.2 As such, the
national security exception mainly assuages the protectionist
concerns of participants in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).3 The
fundamental concern is how to balance national security against
market liberalization.4 On one hand, the host state has to protect its
1
International investment or capital flows fall into four principal categories:
commercial loans, official flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Foreign direct investment (FDI) pertains to international investment in which the investor obtains a lasting interest in an enterprise in another
state. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (2015) available at
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1245 (reporting that the global expansion of FDI is currently being driven by over 65,000
transnational corporations with more than 850,000 foreign affiliates).
2 See, e.g., Cathleen H. Hartge, China’s National Security Review: Motivations and
the Implications for Investors, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 239 (2013) (exploring the Chinese
decision to review foreign investments in domestic companies to ensure there are
not national security implications).
3 See generally Rumu Sarkar, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Furthering Development or
Impeding it, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1181 (2008); see also Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned
Enterprises and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103
(2009) [hereinafter Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis] (describing the evolution of attitudes towards SWFs and foreign sovereign’s involvement in domestic
markets); Xiaolei Sun et al., China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in Overseas
Energy: The Energy Security Perspective, 65 ENERGY POL’Y 654 (2014) (exploring how
China focuses investments on energy sectors and how that affects the energy security of the state).
4
See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34336, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2008) (showing the benefits
and issues of SWFs and the hopes for guidelines to be established by international
institutions like the IMF); Robert M. Kimmitt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World
Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 119 (2008) (setting out the questions associated with SWFs
and hoping to set up a better understanding of the issues which would promote
stability in the global economy); see also Yvonne C. L. Lee, The Governance Of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 Hastings Bus. L. J. 197 (2010) (considering the
current world of foreign investments and how SWFs increase in prevalence coincides with increased flow from ‘non-Western’ countries); Joel Slawotsky, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in the United States, 29 BANK. & FIN. SERV.
POL’Y REPORT 1 (2010) (looking at possible ways for the United States to improve its
regulatory scheme with respect to SWFs); Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds:
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own citizens; while on the other hand, the foreign investors are
concerned about being discriminated against due to an abuse of
protective measures by the host state. Such protective acts may also
bring further political tensions.5 The issue of sovereign investment
has attracted attention because of its opaqueness.6 Because
governments are involved, some suspect that the true motives of
sovereign investment are politically driven. Many SWFs lack
transparency, so the host state cannot determine whether the
intentions of such investment are genuinely commercial or whether
the investment will jeopardize national security and financial
stability.7 Governments believe that if strategic industries fall under
foreign control, the foreign government will take advantage of this
control to attack the host state.8 For instance, assuming that a
foreign state acquires a telecommunication company, it is
reasonable to assert that there could be a leak of confidential
information by surveillance.9 Especially after the 9-11 terrorist
attack, these concerns have prompted some countries to regulate
and restrict sovereign investment in certain sectors, such as
The New Barbarians at the Gate? An Analysis of The Legal and Business Implications Of
Their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 97 (2009) (analyzing the pros and cons of
SWFs); Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds Investment in the Shadow of Regulation and
Politics, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1207 (2009) (probing the increase in SWFs and the assorted
interests of all of the relevant parties).
5
See, e.g., Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment and the
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 42 INT’L LAW 1231 (2008) (evaluating the concerns and hopes of SWFs and the reaction from governmental regulators); Javier
Santiso, Sovereign Development Funds, 58 POL’Y INSIGHTS 1 (2008) (investigating the
incredible possibilities for SWFs if they choose to start focusing on development
finance and helping the developing world); Doug Palmer, Rise of China State-Owned
Firms Rattles U.S. Companies, REUTERS, Aug 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/us-usa-china-bigcompanies-idUSTRE77G3Z320110817 (comparing the relative power in the global economy between America and China).
6
See generally Yvonne C. L. Lee, A Reversal of Neo-Colonialism: the Pitfalls and
Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2009); Adrian B. Wignall
et al., Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issues, FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 117
(2008).
7
See Gordon L. Clark & Eric R. W. Knight, Temptation and the Virtues of LongTerm Commitment: The Governance of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, 1 ASIAN J.
INT’L L. 321 (2011) (advocating for a more long-term perspective in response to
SWFs and using the Australian SWF as an example of what should be done).
8 See Patrick J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears: Should Debts
to Citizens be Treated Differently than Debts to Other Creditors, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 431
(2009) (showing that SWFs treat “two masters with very different agendas”).
9 See Maurizia D. Bellis, Global Standards for Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Quest
for Transparency, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 349 (2011) (presenting the impact of SWFs using
two focuses: global standards and transparency).
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telecommunication and commodities.10 Even though there are
studies which indicate that such restrictions are unnecessary,
governments should always guard against such harm.11 Some argue
that these measures are over-protective and discriminatory against
FDIs, and the measures are a breach of international economic law.
The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest outward foreign
direct investor and, at the same time, the world’s leading recipient
of such foreign direct investment (FDI).12 The flows of international
investments into Europe reflect the EU’s open policies regarding the
movement of capital.13 Importantly, while these inward investment
flows include capital from SWFs these represent only a minor share
of the total FDI transactions per year. Nevertheless, the EU and its
members have abandoned their liberal approach towards foreign
FDI when it comes to SWFs. In recent years, some EU member states
have even expressed the fear14 that SWFs are lining up for a
shopping spree that would bring many EU companies under the
heavy influence of foreign governments.
10
See generally Michael Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign
Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United
States? 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 712 (2009); Matthew A. Melone, Should The United States
Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds, 26 B. U. INT’L L. J. 143 (2008) (exploring the possible
ways for the US to react to the increase in SWFs in its economy, particularly using
tax policy); see also Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Using the Market and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Together To Make the United States More Secure, 118 YALE L. J. 88 (2008) (studying the
protections that are available to ensure the SWFs act appropriately).
11
See generally Arina V. Popova, We Don’t Want To Conquer You; We Have
Enough To Worry About: The Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, 118 YALE L. J. 109 (2008).
12 In 2013, the inward flows (into the EU) amounted to 327€ billions while the
outward flows (EU to the rest of the world) amounted to 341€ billions. In terms of
percentage, EU inward stock (34% of world inward investment) while the outward
stock (46% of world outward investment). For the official EU statistics, see Eurostat
Portal available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb.
13 Such a liberal policy was recalled in the October 2015 strategy communication published by the European Commission. See European Commission, Trade for
All: European Commission presents new trade and investment strategy (Oct. 14,
2015) (Press Release) (available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1381) [hereinafter Trade for All], the full text of the Communication is
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf; See generally Ramon Torrent, The Contradictory Overlapping of National, EU, Bilateral, and the Multilateral Rules on Foreign Direct Investment: Who is
Guilty of Such a Mess?, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1377-99 [hereinafter Torrent].
14
See Lars-Hendrik Röller & Nicolas Vérnon, SAFE AND SOUND: AN EU
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT (2008) [hereinafter Röller & Vérnon] (describing the double-edged sword of SWFs, the need for the money to be flowing in and
a general aversion to the potential implications of allowing a foreign sovereign to
invest within a state).
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These concerns are worrying politicians, and national
regulations are now in place to screen investments from SWFs.
Reacting to this trend, the European Commission decided to
promote a common European approach to sovereign investment,
i.e., to define at the EU level what policy responses and regulations
should and should not be allowed for member states to utilize.15
Such an intergovernmental approach aims at supplementing
national regulatory responses by supranational efforts that intend to
remain voluntary in nature.
Why a EU approach? As usual the Commission states that “a
common EU approach would maximize European influence in these
wider discussions.”16 Even more important is the fact that, if the EU
fails to agree on a common line, individual member states will
possibly resort to measures of their own. These resulting barriers
would very likely impede the fundamental free movement of
capital, not only from outside the EU but also within common
European market. Such an “un-coordinated series of responses
would fragment the internal market and damage the European
economy as a whole.”17
This article seeks to analyze the existing legal regime applicable
to SWFs in the EU and to assess its capacity to answer the call for
control, while maintaining the attractiveness of the EU market as an
investment location. Firstly, we define the concept of SWFs and
present the main trends of SWF investment in Europe as well as the
main concerns regarding their effects. Secondly, we critically
analyze the current regulatory framework within the EU and this
will lead us to suggest particular amendments to the relevant Treaty
provision. Thirdly, we explore the EU contribution to promoting a
multilateral approach for the regulation of the SWFs’ operations.

15
For a political and legal examination of the EU decision-making process in
external economic policy, see Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment—How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the
Emerging Global Regime, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51 (2012) [hereinafter Chaisse, Promises
and Pitfalls] (analyzing the effects of moving the decision-making on investment
treaties from individual countries to the EU).
16
A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, EUR. PARL.
DOC., COM (2008) 115 provisional, 6 [hereinafter Commission Communication 2008].
17 Id. at 7.
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2. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF RISING STATE
CAPITALISM
‘State capitalism’ is usually described as an economic system in
which commercial economic activity is undertaken by the state in
the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Also, the management
and organization of these SOEs’ means of production is in a
capitalist manner. Ming Du stated that state capitalism is the
Chinese economic system, and that it is fundamentally different
from Western liberal market capitalism. Also, the substantial reason
that state capitalism has been developed in China is because the
Chinese government has transformed the nation’s economy from a
command one to a market one (i.e., socialism with Chinese
characteristics). The way that the Chinese government exercises
‘state capitalism’ is that it directly or indirectly controls a large
number of powerful SOEs, especially in the strategic and key sectors
(e.g., China Sinopec).18 Kratsas and Truby argue “the interests of
sovereign and private investors clash” through state-directed
capitalism and accept Keynes’s maxim that “international cash
flows are always political,” and Kratsas and Truby have stated that
it is problematic.19
2.1. Operations of SWFs in Europe
The increasing presence of SWF investment in the EU, much as
in the United States, has given rise to various concerns regarding
sovereign investment in the EU market.20 Protectionist tendencies,
already an area of concern in the EU, could be further provoked by
this rise in SWF activity.21 Owing to the geography and historical
18
See Ming Du, China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law, 409 (2014) (exploring how China’s use of state owned enterprises has completely overtaken the
Chinese economy and how this could be a major problem with the WTO’s interpretations of the legality of state owned enterprises).
19 See Georges Kratsas & Jon Truby, Regulating Sovereign Wealth Funds To Avoid
Investment Protectionism, 95 J. FIN. REG. 114, 121 (2015) [hereinafter Kratsas & Truby]
(evaluating the issues with the current responses to the increases in SWFs globally
and specifically in the US).
20
See Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis, supra note 3 (exploring the
flow of Chinese savings to finance the US’ current account deficit).
21
See Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty, & Jaydeep Mukherjee, Emerging
Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Making: Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory
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rivalry on the European continent, however, EU governments are
perhaps more concentrated on investments from Russia.22 At the
same time, the US market remained a more attractive destination for
foreign investors during the Global Financial Crisis. These two
variables explain to some extent the different perceptions on the two
sides of the Atlantic and the differences in terms of regulatory
approach. The important difference lies in the fact that the EU, in
terms both of regulation and policy, declares, as a principle, that all
restrictions on the movement of capital involving member states
(both with other States in the EU and with states outside the EU)
should be banned.23 It thus extends the liberalization of capital
movements to and from third countries whatever the investor class.
This traditional positive perception of foreign investments explains
to a large extent why the EU has expressed a general trust with few
concerns and has also largely welcomed SWFs investments over the
last few years. Concerns, however, exist and they have contributed
to generating tensions between national governments and the
supra-national level.
Investments of SWFs in international capital markets, including
in Europe, have increased greatly in recent years. While the lack of
transparency makes it very difficult to have fully comprehensive
analysis of SWFs’ operations, reports suggest that Europe is an
important destination for SWFs’ investments.24 As a result of the
financial crisis and the ensuing recession, the need for international
investment in the EU has also been growing and will continue to
grow as suggested by the recently announced EU "Investment
Plan."25 Some of these investments come from countries whose
political regimes are considerably less liberal than those in EU
Strategies, 45 J.W.T. 837 (2011) (exploring the issues a government may face as they
begin to set up a SWF).
22 See Stephen Jen & Oliver Weeks, Celebrating the Birth of Russia’s SWF 1 (2008)
(estimating that while Russia’s new SWF is relatively small at the beginning it will
become a massive SWF in just a few short years if oil prices remain high).
23 This principle of freedom movement of capital between member states and
between member states and third countries is subject to limited exceptions. See
TFEU, infra note 104, at Article 65 § III(B).
24 See infra note 26.
25 The Investment Plan for Europe aims to revive investment in strategic projects around Europe to ensure that money reaches the real economy. See Jyrki Katainen, Investment Plan, EUROPA.EU (last visited Dec. 3, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/index_en.htm (describing the
Investment Plan for Europe as a package of measures to unlock public and private
investments in the real economy of at least € 315 billion through 2017).
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countries. There is, however, an informational problem with SWFs,
which is partly due to a lack of transparency and clear
communication on the part of the funds themselves. There are no
exhaustive figures of SWF activities in the EU common market.26
However, it has been reported by many newspapers that many of
the larger and more prominent SWFs, including the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority (ADIA), the Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation (GIC), the Qatar Investment Authority
(QIA), and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), are active in
Europe. However, the value of their investments, although
important, remains at a lower level than the investments made in
the US market.27 SWFs invest in very diverse sectors and industries,
although there is a certain predominance of investment in services.
Primarily, it appears that investments of SWFs in Europe are less
frequent than in the United States.28 Consequently the security
issues in the EU are not as pressing as they are in the United States.
This explains to a large extent the soft position adopted in Europe,
balancing concerns with foreign investment with an overall trust for
SWFs.
2.2. European concerns about SWFs
In the particular case of Europe, four concerns are brought to the
fore by SWF investments. Firstly, the role and involvement of
governments in SWF strategies is called into question. Secondly, the
26
A study on the investment operations of 18 SWFs in 2014 found that the
European Union received $16.4 billion, making the EU the second most important
destination for SWFs’ investments. The same study suggests that $11.7 billion goes
to UK, which leads the recipient EU countries, followed by Italy, Netherlands,
France, Spain and Germany. TOWARDS A NEW NORMAL: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
ANNUAL REPORT 2014, Bocconi University, 28-29, http://www.unibocconi.it/wps/wcm/connect/83cfaeaa-d5fd-4021-802115104503a863/SIL_Report_2015.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. Another study, which uses
a different methodology, suggests that Spain has been the main recipient, receiving
$ 8.34 billion, ahead of France, the UK and Germany. Sovereign Wealth Fund Report
2014,
ESADEgeo,
8,
https://www.kpmg.com/ES/es/ActualidadyNovedades/ArticulosyPublicacion
es/Documents/sovereign-weath-funds-v2.pdf.
27 See generally WILLIAM MIRACKY et al., ASSESSING THE RISKS: THE BEHAVIORS OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008).
28
See Steffen Kern, SWFS and Foreign Investment Policies – An Update 8 (2008)
(assessing the current outlook for SWFs and looking at the policies that have gotten
them here).
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lack of transparency of SWFs is also a cause for concern. Thirdly,
the alleged political objectives of SWFs are feared because they may
turn SWFs into secretive government investment vehicles. Finally,
some might find the shift in the balance of power in the world
economy from Western industrialized countries to new emerging
market giants difficult to accept.29 These four issues are considered
below.30
Firstly, liberals advocate free market forces and commercial
activity. In a free market, the relationship between supply and
demand will work itself out and weed out those goods and services
that are less profitable. This market, with freedom of choice as to
what an individual buys, does not need any interference by the
state.31 Since the inception of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, EC policies
have shunned the role of the states and have discouraged
government intervention in economic and financial affairs; a
decisive step was achieved with the 1987 Single European Act (SEA)
the main effect of which was to set a deadline for the creation of an
encompassing single market by 1992.32 The 20-year period
following deregulation and the removal of border restrictions in the
Common Market provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and
private corporations have grown rapidly in size and influence. As a
result, the activity of SWFs is a cause for concern since it contradicts

29
See Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L.
& BUS. REV. AMS. 5 (2008) (exploring the growth of SWFs in the past 60 years).
30 See Matthew Saxon, It’s Just Business, Or Is It?: How Business and Politics Collide With Sovereign Wealth Funds, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (2009) (analyzing how political interests are being infused into businesses with SWFs and the
potential dangers this causes); see also Heike Schweitzer, Sovereign Wealth Funds:
Market Investors or “Imperialist Capitalists”? The European Response to Direct Investment by Non-EU State-Controlled Entities, 2 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 79 (2011) [hereinafter Schweitzer] (considering the ways in which Europe has responded to the
explosion of SWFs globally).
31
See Bryan Druzin, Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to
Shrink the Size of Law, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 100, 110-12 (2014) (evaluating the complexity of governmental intrusion into the market and showing the view of many rightleaning economists that informational complexity of the market “fundamentally
precludes the possibility of successful central market planning”).
32
The Single European Act (SEA), 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1; see Ingolf Pernice, The
Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349 (2009)
(showing the new structure created by the Treaty of Lisbon which units countries
in a supranational way without hopes of forming a state).
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the trend of reducing the involvement of governments in the EU and
global economy.33
Secondly, the operations of SWFs are often obscured, with
disclosure limited to the regulatory compliance obligations imposed
by host states. However, the same is true for hedge funds, which
are a relatively lightly regulated investment fund. The light
regulation applicable – or even sometimes the absence of any
regulation – means that they may not be obliged to disclose their
holdings either completely or in part.34 Further, it has been argued
that SWFs, although similar to hedge funds without long-term
investment objectives, are less transparent than hedge funds and
therefore more worrying.35 One can also observe significant
inconsistencies in the SWF disclosures. The Norwegian SWF (The
Government Pension Fund–Global) provides perhaps one of the few
exceptions to the practice of limited disclosure.36 Overall, SWFs
usually lack transparent structures and management processes that
are domestically and internationally accountable. They work in an
opaque way, publishing neither statistics on their composition nor
33
See also Remarks of Nathalie B. Osterwalder, EUR. PARL. HEARING ON
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Nov. 9, 2010) (presenting a new way of looking at foreign investments and hoping to increase transparency in these arenas).
34
The EU is proposing to tighten the regulatory regime of its hedge fund industry by: (1) limiting hedge funds’ borrowing; (2) imposing a registration requirement for funds with more than US$134 million under management; and (3) imposing limits on pay, among other regulations. See Nikki Tait & Martin Arnold,
European Union Hedge Fund Plans Under Fire, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7a4df78-c416-11df-b827-00144feab49a.html
(reporting that considerations of regulating hedge funds and private equity had the
potential to be a big problem in Europe); see also Nikki Tait, Ben Hall, & Tom
Braithewaite, French Pave Way for EU Hedge Fund, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, available
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3c5e8b2-d15a-11df-96d1-00144feabdc0.html
(stating that France and Germany are in favor of the proposed legislation and outlining how France’s dissipating opposition allowed for passage of regulating hedge
funds).
35
See, e.g., Edwin M. Truman, Four Myths about Sovereign Wealth Funds,
VOXEU.ORG 1 (2008), available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1539
(debunking four popular myths about SWFs).
36 See Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment From Multinational
Corporations for Human Rights Violations—The Case of Norway’s Sovereign Wealth
Fund, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 577, 577-82 (2008) (evaluating how Norway, one of the
world’s largest petroleum exporters, has invested its oil wealth in a fund with a
market value, at the time, of more than US$ 350 billion making it Europe’s largest
SWF, and second only to the UAE); see also Anthony Wong, Sovereign Wealth Funds
and the Problem of Asymmetric Information: The Santiago Principles and International
Regulations, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1081 (2009) (exploring possible solutions to the
problems that the world faces with the increasing prevalence of SWFs).
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on their investments and strategies.37 For this reason, even the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has had to rely on a collection of
estimates by private financial institutions to assess the size of these
funds.38 There has been a slight, yet very important and positive
improvement since 2014 (when the International Forum of
Sovereign Wealth Funds first published a partial complianceassessment of fifteen SWFs with the Santiago Principles). 39
Thirdly, if the role of governments, through and within SWFs, is
more utilized than classical economic theory requires, it follows that
investment decisions by public investors, and by the SWFs in
particular, are not made solely in search optimal risk-adjusted rates
of return.40 Currently there is no evidence that SWFs have or will
control firms to implement governmental policy. However, host
countries cannot summarily assume that SWFs investments will
never be guided by political objectives or that the management of
SWFs will never be motivated by ‘nationalistic considerations’
deviating from conventional wealth maximization.41 One may
wonder, can a government use its SWF as a financial instrument to
achieve a political objective? Russia and China are regularly singled
out as countries with major strategic and political interests shown in

37 The scope and scale of SWFs further increases the potential for deliberate or
accidental financial disruption. In a period of global financial turmoil such as at the
present, concerns as to the responsibility of SWF managers to act in a stabilising
manner will continue to be prominent.
38
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-946, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: PUBLICALLY AVAILABLE DATA ON SIZES AND INVESTMENT FOR SOME FUNDS ARE
LIMITED 11 (2008) (finding that that only thirteen countries separately reported their
SWF holdings in public IMF documents). In the absence of official national or international public reporting, much of the available information about the value of
holdings for many SWFs is from estimates by private researchers who project funds
sizes by adjusting any reported amounts to reflect likely reserve growth and asset
market returns. Id. at 17.
39
See Santiago Principles: 15 Case Studies, International Forum of Sovereign
Wealth Funds (Nov. 2014) http://www.ifswf.org/pst/SantiagoP15CaseStudies1.pdf .
40
See Roland Beck & Michael Fidora, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on
Global Financial Markets, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 91, at
14 (July 2008) (examining how the increase of SWFs impacts the flow of global currencies).
41 See Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts
about their Determinants and Governance 23 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 14562, 2008) (outlining how the goals of the SWF will dictate
how risky the assets it invests in will be).
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their SWF usage.42 These countries also have strategies to control
critical assets, such as infrastructure, and this raises issues of market
integrity as well as concerns over national security.43
Fourthly, the rise of SWFs is a sign of the shift in the world
economic balance of power away from Western industrialized
countries and towards new emerging market giants like China, the
oil-rich Middle East, and perhaps even India.44 According to Philipp
Hildebrand, capital has:
[H]istorically tended to flow from the core of an economic
system to its periphery . . . sovereign wealth funds play a
potentially important role in this apparent reversal. The
sense that capital is increasingly flowing from the periphery
to the core is raising a variety of political sensitivities in the
core countries.45
The rise of SWFs is more than the addition of a new asset class.
The growth in size and importance of SWFs is a reflection of the new
role of developing economies which illustrates a shift in emphasis
in the global economy. In recent decades, the rule was for Western
companies and portfolio investors to invest in developing countries,
while now one may observe that “the growing capital surpluses in
developing countries will seek out profitable investment
42 See Julien Chaisse et al., Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia: Strategic and Policy Challenges 40 (2009) (discussing how companies engaged in industries of strategic importance to the development of China, such as natural resources and infrastructure, have been supported so actively by government authorities that one may
consider that China ‘built’ some of its Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and how
the acquisition of strategic assets and capabilities such as brands, distribution networks, and foreign capital markets, and so on, is often supported by the Chinese
government).
43
See Edward Greene & Brian Yeager, Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Measured
Assessment, 3 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 247 (2008) [hereinafter Greene & Yeager] (exploring
the different objectives of different state actors in their having SWFs).
44
See Sanjay Dutta, Government Plans Sovereign Wealth Fund, TIMES OF INDIA,
Sep. 17, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Govtplans-sovereign-wealth-fund/articleshow/22643338.cms (detailing plans for an Indian SWF to materialize as indicated by Indian officials); see also Archana
Chaudhary, Coal India to Use Planned Sovereign Fund to Buy Mines, BLOOMBERG (July
8, 2010, 12:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-07-07/coalindia-may-use-proposed-sovereign-fund-to-acquire-mine-assets-overseas (reporting that any proposed Indian SWF would be set up with the clear intention to help
state companies compete for overseas energy assets with China).
45 Philipp M. Hildebrand, The Challenge of Sovereign Wealth Funds, VOX: CEPR’S
POLICY
PORTAL
(January
21,
2008),
http://www.voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/881.
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opportunities in developed economies.”46 In some cases this is
achieved through private sector investment, but since many
emerging and developing countries do not (for various reasons)
have privately owned companies of sufficient size to invest
significantly in industrialized countries, this is increasingly done by
SWFs.
3. BALANCING CAPITAL FLOWS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE EU
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
National security is the idea that a state must keep its property
safe in order to protect its citizens. This is a concept that a
government, along with its law-making bodies (e.g., parliament(s)),
should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of ‘national’
crises through a variety of power projections. Projections of power
may manifest itself in such ways as political power, diplomacy,
economic power, military might, and so on. In this respect, there is
a unique national security challenge for policy-makers posed by
SWFs due to concerns about their legitimacy and integrity as
investors.47 SWFs may be used for political purposes by those
sovereign owners, which might threaten the political and economic
security of the states in which they invest. Christopher Cox, the
chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission,
commented that these government-controlled funds may not be
created for investment returns and could be in pursuit of other
government interests.48 Some have expressed a fear that these
investments could give those state investors access to sensitive
security information of the host state in the infrastructure, energy,
and technology sectors. At least, those state investors may gain
control of those critically important industries, acquire proprietary
knowledge, sensitive technology and scarce resources by
46 See Julien Chaisse et al., Expansion of Trade and FDI in Emerging Asia: Strategic
and Policy Challenges 84 (2009).
47
See Meg Lippincott, Depoliticizing Sovereign Wealth Funds Through International Arbitration, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 649, 651 (2013) [hereinafter Lippincott] (positing
that accountability through international arbitration motivates SWFs to behave as
private investors).
48
See Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
440, 513 (2009) (noting that significant investments by the Abu Dhabi fund in the
United States threaten American policy-makers’ “future ability to oppose Abu
Dhabi on matters related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, terrorism or military
concerns, or other diplomatic efforts” for fear of economic retaliation).
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purchasing a controlling stake in those companies. In order to
address these issues, the international economy provides some
principles that must be respected by the EU and its member states.49
As such, WTO law, and its specific agreement on trade in services—
the GATS—provides a first regulatory framework which is
complemented by the international investment agreements that
have been concluded by the EU and its member states.
3.1. Implications for SWF Investment from the General Agreement on
Trade in Services
Since most countries involved in FDI are WTO members, WTO
law becomes a principal method of solving any legal problems. This
applies to EU member states, which are all WTO members and
hence bound by the rules of the multilateral organization.50 This
section will first discuss why the GATS is more relevant and when
the GATS is applicable in the context of SWFs, then it will illustrate
some major roles of the national security exception under the GATS,
and lastly it will examine some underlying problems. Within the
WTO treaties, the GATS is more relevant and important in the
context of SWFs because it is the only legally binding law in relation
to investment.51
Although the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
does contain an article about ‘security exception,’52 and thus is
theoretically applicable, its principles are relatively limited. Some
scholars consider that GATT is too general.53 Even with its
investment-related reference treaty, the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures (TRIMs), the GATT is still short of
specific discipline. It means that the general principles provided
may not be applicable to some specific investments, whereas the
See generally Torrent, supra note 13.
Id.
51 See Bart de Meester, International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Reconciling International Economic Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role of
the State, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 779, 801 (2009) [hereinafter de Meester] (evaluating the
global legal framework for SWFs).
52 Article X, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
53 See generally Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization 1 (Peterson Institute, Working Paper No. 08-2, 2008).
49
50
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TRIMs do not give enough additional support and reference.54 On
the contrary, the GATS is more relevant when talking about FDIs
like SWFs because FDI nowadays trends towards the service sector.
The purpose of GATS is to make sure the service sectors are
liberalized for foreign investment,55 including state investments like
SOEs and SWFs, by “facilitating the freedom of capital inflows in the
service sector.”56 Hence, it is more specific yet flexible to be applied
to service-related FDIs.57 The GATS is applicable to FDI when the
investment takes the form of ‘commercial presence’ mode in the
service sectors in the EU economy, meaning that the foreign investor
holds at least 50% ownership.58 Therefore, only when SWFs tend to
take control of the target company in the EU will the GATS be
applicable.59
To promote market liberalization in service sectors to foreign
investors, the GATS imposes obligations on the host states.60
However, these obligations are subject to the general exceptions and
specific exceptions that allow the EU and its member states to
deviate from the rules. The GATS Article 14bis ‘security exception’
is the illustration of the general exceptions regarding national
security that the host state can rely on to refuse foreign investments.
The purpose of this exception is to ‘preserve members’ freedom of

54
See Fabio Bassan, Host States and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Between National
Security and International Law, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 165, 172 (2010) [hereinafter Bassan] (examining the efficacy of current regulations on SWFs).
55
See de Meester, supra note 51, at 800-01 (detailing the reduction in crossborder trade barriers instituted by GATS).
56
See Efraim Chalamish, Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds, 13
THEORETICAL INQ. L. J. 645, 661 (2012) [hereinafter Chalamish] (determining that
governmental attempts to block cross-border investment by SWFs violates commitments in international law).
57 Bassan, supra note 54, at 173.
58 Chalamish, supra note 56, at 660-61.
59 Bassan, supra note 54, at 174.
60
See Julien Chaisse et al., Deconstructing Service and Investment Negotiating
Stance: A Case Study of India at WTO GATS and Investment Fora, 14 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 44, 54-55 (2013) (observing that general obligations are imposed on the host
states based on the most-favored nation (MFN) principle, whereas obligations related to market access and national treatment are imposed only in specific service
sectors); see also Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law to
Sovereign Investments: Sovereign Wealth Funds as “Investors” under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, INT’L REV. L. 1 (2015), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2015.swf.9 [hereinafter Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law] (analyzing the impact of GATS as a liberalizing device for SWFs).
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action in areas relating to national defence and security.61 The article
provides that the states are excepted from the non-discriminatory
obligations imposed when the investment concerns ‘essential
security interest.’62 It is reasonable for the host states to enforce
necessary actions to restrain the access of FDIs to defend their
national security interests and uphold public safety and stability.
The GATS plays an important role in the context of sovereign
investment because it liberalizes markets for foreign investments.63
It is suggested that the GATS “provides a useful framework for
avoiding national measures that restrict investments by SWFs
endanger an open investment client, while at the same time ensuring
that WTO Members can protect important interests.”64
The GATS promotes market liberalization by imposing
obligations upon the members, including the EU, while allowing the
states to make exceptions, including the national security exception,
under GATS Article 14bis, when there is a need for national
protection. In the context of SWFs, the national security exception
helps to balance the control of national security and investment
opportunities.
Originally, foreign investments were genuinely for commercial
purposes, but because governments fund the foreign investments,
some states will be suspicious of the true purpose behind them.
There are two possibilities: that the government in control of the
SWFs truly tends to attack the host state via SWFs and SOEs, or that
the SWFs and SOEs are purely for commercial purposes but the host
government abuses the national security exception to reject the
investment because of political reasons. Under the former scenario,
the exception is a shield for the host state to block potential threats
to its national security; under the latter scenario, the exception acts
like a protector to escort the SWF throughout the process. Studies
show that most sovereign investments are purely for commercial
purposes because there is no meaningful benefit in spending so
much money and time to indirectly attack another sovereignty via

Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law, supra note 60, at 12.
Art. XIVbis, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869
U.N.T.S 183.
63
See Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law, supra note 60,
at 4-5 (detailing how GATS encourages liberalization through positive list approaches).
64 de Meester, supra note 51, at 811.
61
62
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SWFs.65 Hence, the rejected cases are considered an abuse of the
security exception.66 So, some scholars believe that the exception
would “level the playing field with other investors and prevent host
states from politically retaliating against a state by denying SWF
investments. This is an important aspect of liberating SWFs from
becoming political battlefields.”67 Therefore, the national security
exception is a protector that depoliticizes SWFs and encourages
trade liberalization.
Some scholars believe that the national security exception under
WTO law provides a forum to cope with protective measures
against SWFs.68 Because the GATS is legally binding between the
WTO members and the WTO, the WTO may exercise its political
influence/control towards those who breach the law, and it offers a
preferred platform for sovereignties to tackle related issues and to
make appropriate decisions or concessions accordingly. With the
power and influence of WTO and the treaty, both parties can
negotiate and end up with a win-win solution. However, the
national security exception can only be a very partial solution to the
matters raised by protective measures against SWFs. The exceptions
should be “interpreted in conjunction with other provisions in the
same treaty” but not alone69 because the GATS Article 14bis is only
one of the articles and it addresses only the exceptions. In addition,
the exception under the GATS does not specifically give exemptions
to sovereign investments.70 There may be other general exceptions
or even specific exceptions in the GATS or even other provisions in
the GATT or TRIMs that contradict the national security exception.
As a result, it is uncertain whether the national security exception
65
See, e.g., David Murray, SWFs: Myths and Realities, (Keynote Address)
Global Sovereign Funds Roundtable, May 5, 2011, http://www.ifswf.org/pst/london11.pdf.
66
See Kratsas & Truby, supra note 19, at 98-102 (detailing the relative opacity
and history of investment patterns among SWFs).
67 Lippincott, supra note 47, at 664.
68
See Chalamish, supra note 56, at 663-65 (surveying the various means by
which GATS-issued exceptions applies to investments by SWFs); see also Locknie
Hsu, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 451, 457 (2009) [hereinafter Hsu] (assessing the impact
WTO agreements have on SWFs).
69
See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 465 (2007-2008) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman & Billa]
(weighing the impact of GATS Article XXI on a 1985 trade embargo between Nicaragua and the United States).
70 See Hsu, supra note 68, at 457 (noting the limited scope of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures binding participating members).
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article will prevail over the others. Therefore, the national security
exceptions can provide only limited guarantees to the SWFs.71
However, the exception creates another underlying matter,
which limits the achievement of the liberalization goal. Most
authors agree that the phrase ‘essential security interest’ creates a
degree of uncertainty regarding reliance on the exception. The
causes of the uncertainty are that the WTO has not provided any
clear definition in clarifying the scope of the term “essential
security,”72 and also because different states hold different notions
regarding the phrase.73 It is uncertain when the host states will reject
the foreign investments in breach of any obligations.74 It is unclear
what kinds of FDI will prompt the host states to invoke the security
exception.75
This lack of clarity results both in unpredictability for foreign
investors to plan their future investments and an unfriendly
investment environment that may discourage further sovereign
investment. Because of the uncertainty, either the host state or the
foreign government can easily rely on and easily make use of the
exception.76 Firstly, the WTO has not clarified the scope of the
national security exception. Secondly, there is inadequate case law
to illustrate the correct use of the exception, to what extent, and to
which service sectors the exception is applicable.
The unpredictability of the WTO law and the protective
measures imposed by the host state create a barrier to entry for
SWFs in the EU and elsewhere. Hence, this will possibly result in
counter-effects, which do not harmonize the market but worsen the
relationships between the member countries, or even foster political
revenge.

71
See Bassan, supra note 54, at 196 (detailing the policy rationale behind the
limited applicability of GATT and TRIMs rules to SWFs).
72 See Hsu, supra note 68, at 464 (considering the implications of the vagueness
in defining “essential security” for foreign investors).
73
See Bassan, supra note 54, at 190 (detailing various state interpretations of
the ambiguity behind “essential security”).
74 See Claudia Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under
Investment Treaties, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 531, 551-554 (2011) (discussing the multiple
theories of jurisdiction concerning investor-state relations).
75
See Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law, supra note 60,
at 13-14 (affirming the difficulty of defining what categories of investment are applicable to the GATT national security exception).
76 See Bassan, supra note 54, at 177 (detailing the ambiguity of the GATS Annex
on financial investors and SWFs).
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3.2. The International Investment Treaties Approach
In addition to the WTO law, IIAs have become popular between
countries to promote market liberalization and to create more
investment opportunities. This section focuses on discussing how
the national security exception in IIAs deals with SWFs by looking
at some significant examples.
Since December 2009, investment is part of the EU’s common
commercial policy.77 As a consequence, the European Commission
may legislate on investment. The European Commission outlined
its approach for the EU’s future investment policy in its
Communication “Towards a comprehensive European international

77
See, e.g., Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and
Its Member States in the Area of Investment Politics, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND EU LAW 29-42 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the reasons for the 2009
EU transfer of competencies with member states in international investment policy); Marc Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 123-51 (Christoph
Herrmann et al. eds., 2010) (describing the challenges EU policy after the Treaty of
Lisbon faces in light of economic competition with the U.S. and China); Marc
Bungenberg, The Politics of the European Union’s Investment Treaty-Making, in THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 133-61 (Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011)
(detailing the interaction of law and politics in EU bilateral investment treaty making); N. Jansen Calamita, The Making of Europe’s International Investment Policy: Uncertain First Steps, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 301-30 (2012) (evaluating
main issues facing EU in developing international investment policies); Jan
Ceyssens, Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in the
European Constitution, 32 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 259-91 (2005) (assessing that European Constitution’s foreign investment policy will lead to greater
cooperation between EU and member state policies); Joachim Karl, The Competence
for Foreign Direct Investment: New Powers for the European Union?, 5 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 413-448 (2004) (addressing the possible implications of an EU competence
for foreign direct investment on member states); Marcus Klamert & Niklas Maydell,
Lost in Exclusivity: Implied Non-Exclusive External Competences in Community Law, 13
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 493-513 (2008) (asserting the existence of implied exclusive
competencies is affirmed by recent opinions from the European Court of Justice);
Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Future of the BITs of European Member States after Lisbon,
29 ASA BULLETIN 212 (2011) (contending European Commission’s claim of exclusive
competence will politicize discussion in investment treaty arbitration); Markus Krajewski, External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More
Democratic Common Commercial Policy?, 42 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 91-127 (2005)
(determining whether European Constitution Treaty democratizes and federalizes
EU common commercial policy); Torrent, supra note 13 (asserting that the bilateral
investment treaties of EU member states contradict the EU Court of Justice’s jurisprudence).
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investment policy” in 2010.78 This policy contributes to the
objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, set out in the
Europe 2020 Strategy.79 However, since 2009, a dual regime exists
which provides for the existence of both EU member states’
investment treaties and newly negotiated EU investment treaties.80
78
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Towards
a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, COM (2010) 343 final (July
7, 2010) [hereinafter Communication from the Commission to the Council].
79
Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable, and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (March 3, 2010).
80
In three judgements, the CJEU sided with the Commission by ruling that
Austria, Sweden, and Finland did not take appropriate steps required by ex-Article
307(2) EC (now Article 351 TFEU) to remove incompatibilities of their pre-accession
BITs provisions on free transfers related to investment (transfer clause) with regard
to restrictive measures the Council may take under the Treaty Articles on the free
movement of capital ex-Articles 57(2), 59 and 60 (1) EC. Case C-205/06, Comm’n v.
Austria, CURIA (2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=7264
0&occ=first&dir=&cid=62326; Case C-249/06, Comm’n v. Sweden, CURIA (2009),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=72641&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=62508; Case C118/07, Comm’n v. Finland, CURIA (2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=73856&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=62669. This relatively complex regime is not discussed here. Interested readers may refer to a rich
literature on the topic. For a critical review, see Torrent, supra note 13 (asserting that
EU member states’ BITs contradict the CJEU’s jurisprudence concerning the distribution of competences among the European Community and its member states);
see generally P. J. Kujiper, Foreign Direct Investment: The First Test of the Lisbon Improvements in the Domain of Trade Polity, 37 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 261
(2010); see also Lars Markert, The Crucial Question of Future Investment Treaties: Balancing Investors’ Rights and Regulatory Interests of Host States, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND EU LAW 145-71 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011); Niklas Maydell, The European
Community’s Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment Competence, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 73-92 (August Reinisch &
Christina Knahr eds., 2008); Carsten Nowak, Legal Arrangements for the Promotion
and Protection of Foreign Investments Within the Framework of the EU Association Policy
and European Neighbourhood Policy, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 105-38
(Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011); Federico Ortino & Piet Eeckhout, Towards an EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, in EU LAW AFTER LISBON 312 (Andrea Biondi et. al.
eds., 2012); August Reinisch, The Division of Powers Between the EU and its Member States “After Lisbon,” in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 43-54 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011); Mavluda Sattorova, Return to the Local Remedies Rule in European BITs? Power (Inequalities), Dispute Settlement, and Change in Investment Treaty
Law, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 223-24 (2012); Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls, supra note 15, at 52; Wenhua Shan, Towards a Common European Community
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These investment treaties provide a layer of regulation on SWFs’
investment that the EU and the member states must respect.81
There are two major types of IIAs to be discussed: bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), and preferential trade agreements
(PTAs). BITs are signed by two countries bilaterally; PTAs,
however, are multilateral and usually take forms of free trade
agreements (FTAs). One significant FTA is the North America Free
Trade agreement (NAFTA), concluded between North American
countries. Since IIAs are signed by a number of countries, there
usually are negotiations between parties before the agreement is
concluded. The IIAs are therefore mostly customized based on the
needs and conditions of the relative parties, and this increases the
transparency of the regulations and restrictions. Hence IIAs more
realistically protect both foreign investors and host countries.82
Such features of IIAs help to promote and encourage FDI around
the world. The IIAs also promote FDI by compromising on the
dispute settlement mechanisms. Firstly, clearer definitions of
investors in some BITs give predictability and certainty to foreign
investors.83 This brings comfort to the foreign investors on how the
IIAs protect them in case of disputes. Also, due to the rise of SWFs,
some BITs even contain clauses about state–state dispute resolutions
with a narrower scope.84 The state–state disputes provision with a
narrower scope, yet greater certainty not only encourages
negotiations instead of arbitrations, but also allows SWFs to claim

Policy on Investment Issues, 2 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 603-25; Wenhua Shan & Sheng
Zhang, The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way Toward a Common Investment Policy, 21 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1049-73 (2010); Jörg Philipp Terhechte, Art. 351 TFEU, the Principle of Loyalty
and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties, in EUROPEAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 79-94 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011).
81
The strategy, announced in October 2015, points to the next steps for the
new EU approach to investment protection. See Trade for All, supra note 13, the full
text of the Communication is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.
82 See Lippincott, supra note 47, at 660-61 (examining the protective benefits of
bilateral investment treaties).
83 See Chalamish, supra note 56, at 652-53 (discussing how the definition of an
‘investor’ varies across BITs and how the different definitions can affect the likelihood of foreign direct investment).
84 See Lippincott, supra note 47, at 662-63 (analyzing the narrower scope of the
state to state disputes provision in contrast to the investor-state disputes provision).
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for damages due to any violation of IIAs.85 Therefore, the additional
transparency, predictability and certainty achieved by the
customized features of IIAs and the clear procedural dispute
settlement mechanisms provided give a higher level of protection to
either party.86 This helps investors to plan carefully and wisely in
order to achieve higher return. Thus, IIAs help to encourage FDIs.
The aim of IIAs is to promote trade liberalization between
countries.87 In this respect, the EU’s investment policy is focused on
providing EU investors and investments with market access and
with legal certainty and a stable, predictable, fair, and properly
regulated environment in which to conduct their business.88
The clauses are based on the principles of most-favored nation
(MFN) or national treatment (NT). However, countries still have to
be wary of any investments that may jeopardize their national
safety. Therefore, most IIAs also explicitly include national security
exceptions to ensure that the treaties protect themselves. However,
the difficulty is how the parties strike a balance between national
security and MFN/NT obligations by control. The following
examples show their positions in the context of the exception under
different situations. NAFTA is one of the most significant of all the
IIAs. It was signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico to
promote trade liberalization. NAFTA contains an explicit national
security exception under Article 2102. The provision construed is
very similar to that of WTO law, GATT Article 10 and GATS Article
14bis. It is suggested that “the explicit security provision in NAFTA
gives parties considerable discretion in defining their national
security interests.” 89 The terms related to the national security
85
Id.; see also Chalamish, supra note 56, at 667 (highlighting how investment
agreements cover investments by entities without referring specifically to stateowned entities).
86
See Christian Tietje, Bilateral Investment Treaties Between EU Member States
(intra-EU-BITs) – Challenges in the Multilevel System of Law, 10 TRANSNAT’L DISP.
MGMT. J.. 1 (2013) (discussing the recent progress made in promoting greater transparency in investment law and investment arbitration).
87
See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections–Is a General Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J.
L. & MED. 332 (2013) (analyzing the growth of international law of foreign investment and its effects on trade between countries and dispute resolution).
88 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 78, at 4 (stating the goal of establishing a “common international investment policy” that fosters
stability and therefore encourages international investment).
89
See Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 69, at 470 (claiming that the explicit
security provision in NAFTA is a “ceiling rather than a floor” and cannot be used
to manufacture a wider, implicit national security exception).
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exception under NAFTA – “any actions that it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests”90 – suggest that
the exception is “self-judging,”91 especially with the phrase “it
considers necessary.” It means that when the host state suspects or
believes that the foreign investment tends to be a threat to its public
interest, the government may reject or restrict such an investment
project under this exception in “good faith.”92 Another provision
from NAFTA seems to suggest that the national security exception
is self-judging. Article 1138 provides that if it is an action to restrict
investments, the decision by the host party is not subject to any
dispute settlement provision under the treaty. Some commented
that “if the Parties had agreed that Article 2102 were entirely selfjudging, Article 1138 would not be necessary.”93 Therefore, any
prohibition or restriction imposed on investment-related SWFs
invoked by the national security exception will be a final decision
and not subject to dispute settlement provisions under NAFTA. The
use of such a treaty is very limited in the context of SWFs.
The United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA)
is worth studying in the context of SWFs and national security not
only because Singapore has recently been active in making
sovereign investments in foreign countries and because it is one of
the most influential economies in Asia, but also because the form of
this BIT is quite significant and typical. Singapore has also invested
in several major financial institutions in the United States. The
typical negative list approach is used under the USSFTA, meaning
that the non-applicable service sectors are listed in the Annex.94 The
definition of “investor” is clearly stated in the agreement under
Article 15.1, which does not exclude a SWF as a type of investor. The
most relevant section is Chapter 15 (Investment) in the context of
SWFs. Similar to other BITs, the USSFTA also contains provisions
related to MFN, NT, and the national security exception regarding
expropriation and compensation etcetera in the said chapter.
90
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2102(b), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
91
See Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 69, at 469 (describing the national
security exception in NAFTA article 2102, and its similarities to the exception available in GATT).
92 Id.
93
See id. at 470 (providing evidence that NAFTA article 2102 is “not entirely
self-judging”).
94
See Hsu, supra note 68, at 460 (showing examples of obligations under the
investment and financial services chapters of the USSFTA).
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This raises an issue regarding the national security exception.
Most of the BITs and FTAs that the United States has entered into
have been drafted based on the language from the Treaty in
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNs) or the US Model BIT
2004. These two treaties use the phrase “essential security” instead
of “national security,” as used in the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act (FINSA), which regulates foreign investments
in the United States. The question is whether the BITs or FTAs can
be relied on when it comes to investment disputes.95 The phrase
“essential security” used under the USSFTA Article 21.2 is made
with reference to the GATT Article 10 and GATS Article 14bis.
However, the ambiguous scope and meaning of this term under
WTO law, as mentioned above, does not give sufficient assistance in
interpretation and clarification. Such reference only cycles the issue
of uncertainty and lack of certainty of the term back to the original
starting point. Another question is about remedies after the
prohibition or restriction is made against SWFs.96 Some scholars
have argued that the IIAs focus only on the post-establishment
remedies.97 This is not realistic enough because SWF investors
would usually inject large amounts of capital into the host state for
the establishment before the decision.98 It is uncertain whether this
will be treated as “expropriation” and what remedies the SWF
investors, i.e., the governments, will correspondingly receive.
Sometimes, it appears that IIAs are customized and thus they tend
to provide more certainty and protection to investors. However,
there are still some realistic clarifications required when they refer
back to an unclear term.
After the Argentine economic crises in 2002, Argentina was
involved in a series of lawsuits. The most significant dispute dealing
with the national security exception was between Argentina and the
United States. Like most recent BITs, the Argentine–US BIT allows
state–state dispute settlement concerning the national security
exception. The BIT does contain a security exception provision with
95 See id. at 463 (questioning the applicability of the national security exception
as it relates to BIT or FTA obligations).
96
See id. at 468 (pointing out the weaker negotiating position of the foreign
investor in negotiating risk mitigation agreements arising from national security
concerns).
97
See Chalamish, supra note 56, at 670 (positing that BITs do not really apply
to SWFs pre-establishment, but only post-establishment).
98
See Hsu, supra note 68, at 468 (detailing the national security provisions of
FINSA 2007).
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the use of the phrase “the protection of its own essential security
interests.”99 In one of the cases, it was held that major economic
emergencies are considered to be “essential security interests.”100
So, prima facie, Argentina could invoke the exception. However, the
court continued to express that the article is not self-judging.101 The
decision clearly shows that the court is reluctant to allow the states
to determine whether they can invoke the exceptions.102 The
judgment also provides a framework that when either party would
like to justify its breach of obligations based on the exception of the
BIT, one of the parties should show the relationship between the
measures adopted and the “resolution of the crisis.”103
The Argentine cases provide directions on how the decision
would likely be made, and this increases certainty. The decisions
give more clarifications on how to interpret the security exception
provision of a BIT with the key terms being unclear. The case law
provided lessons to the states for clearer terms and it has assisted
the countries in negotiating and concluding new BITs. After the
Argentine case, the United States updated its treaty language based
on the US Model BIT. The United States has ensured that the
exception is self-judging so it can be invoked easily. Therefore, the
claims actually fill in the existing gap and further help to better the
investment law and promote sovereign investments.
4. THE HARD LAW DIMENSION OF THE EU INTERNAL MARKET
The EU law is extraordinary compared to other multilateral
treaties. Not only does it cater to the member states but it also helps
to promote world trade with the EU by extending its protection to
third countries.104 Another important feature of the EU approach is
99 Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment art. 11, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2
(1993).
100 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Republic of Argentina, para. 360 – ICSID
Case ARB/01/8, Award May 12, 2005.
101 Id.
102 Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 69, at 469.
103 Id. at 486.
104
The Treaty of Rome provided for the free movement of capital, but the
abolition of capital restrictions between member states was to be ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market.’ Despite initial progress in the 1960s, there was a lot of later backtracking as many member states introduced safeguard measures. Many financial operations with other member states
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the application of existing EU laws to SWFs. It serves as a useful
reminder that the free movement of capital is a fundamental
freedom in the European common market, and as such can be
restricted only in clearly limited cases.105 The scope of these
restrictions determines the leeway given to member states to
regulate sovereign investments in their respective territories.106
Most countries have laws and regulations in place that restrict FDI
in industries considered sensitive to national security or
sovereignty.107 Some national regulations give the government a
right to review proposed foreign investment. Any national
legislation that establishes mechanisms to control SWFs is, by its
very nature, an exception to the principles of free movement of
capital and freedom of establishment—free movement of capital
and freedom of establishment being integral features of the EU’s
approach to SWFs.108
The Treaty of Functioning of European Union (TFEU), with a
fundamental principle of the movement of capital, is the focus in the
were subject to prior authorization requirements known as “exchange controls.”
This situation persisted until the early 1990s. Recognizing the damage that this was
doing to the delivery of a single market, the Council adopted a capital liberalization
directive, in 1988, providing for the removal of all remaining exchange controls by
mid-1990 for most of those countries maintaining this mechanism. (Council Directive 88/361/EEC of June 24, 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, O.J. (L. 178) 5–18. There were, though, transition periods provided for Spain,
Ireland, Portugal and Greece.). As part of the drive towards Economic and Monetary Union, the freedom of capital movements gained the same status as the other
Internal Market freedoms with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty. From
January 1, 1994 not only were all restrictions on capital movements and payments
between EU member states prohibited, but so were restrictions between EU member states and third countries. In subsequent EU accession rounds, exchange controls have been progressively eliminated in the period before EU membership. In
general, all capital movements have now been fully liberalized across the EU, although some transitional periods have been granted to some newer member states
for capital operations involving the purchase of real estate (second homes or agricultural land).
105 See Frank Hoffmeister, Litigating Against the European Union and its Member
States - Who Responds Under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of
International Organizations?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 723 (2010) (discussing the role of the
EU and its relationship to its member states in the course of their execution of EU
law); see also Markus Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, 26 J INT’L
ARB. 181 (2009) (writing about the growing importance of the changing dynamic
between investment treaties and European law).
106
See generally Julien Chaisse, Adapting the European Community Legal Structure to the International Trade, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1615 (2006).
107 One example is France. See generally Décret 2005-1739, infra note 230.
108 See Schweitzer, supra note 30, at 301 (discussing the difficulties of completing the EU common market principle of freedom of movement of capital).
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context of SWFs in the EU. The TFEU Article 64 allows the EU
member states to adopt measures dealing with foreign investments
in their territories, including IIAs. It also extends its benefits to other
third-party foreign investors. Out of the two sets of limits provided
to restrain the members from prohibiting or restricting FDIs,
derogations pursuant to the TFEU Article 65 deal with the national
security exception regarding FDIs. The phrase used is “justified on
grounds of public policy or public security.”109 Instead of ‘essential
security’ like NAFTA, which follows the WTO law, the EU law is
more concerned about “public security” or public order. In
addition, this exception is held to be applicable in the situation
regarding FDIs made by non-member states.110
4.1. The principle of the free movement of capital
The free movement of capital is not absolute. Although a
fundamental principle of the TFEU, the movement of capital can be
regulated in two ways at the European level. According to Article
64 of the TFEU, the EU may: (1) adopt, by qualified majority,
“measures on the movement of capital from third countries
involving direct investment,” and (2) “it is not excluded that the
Communication can introduce (by a unanimous decision) measures
that restrict direct investments.”111 Thus, Article 64 of the TFEU

109
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 65(1)(b), 2012 O.J. (C 326) at 26 [hereinafter TFEU].
110
Joined Cases 163/94, 165/94 and 250/94, Sanz de Lera and Others, 1995
E.C.R. I-4823 [hereinafter Sanz de Lera and Others].
111 TFEU art. 64, supra note 104, at 72. The terms “direct investment” appeared
in the Chapter on capital movements and payments of the EC Treaty and now in
Articles 63–66 of the TFEU. In that context, they have been interpreted by the Court
of Justice in light of the Nomenclature annexed to Directive 88/361/EEC of June
24, 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (1988 O.J. (L. 178).5–18),
which in turn is largely based on widely accepted definitions of the IMF and the
OECD. Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v. Comm’rs of
Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-11869 [hereinafter Test Claimants in the FII Group
Litigation]. For different contexts in which the Court has recognized the framework
established in Directive 88/361/EEC as valuable for the implementation of Article
67, see generally Case C-157/05, Holböck v. Salzburg-Land, 2007 E.C.R. I-4051; Case
C-112/05, Comm’n v. Germany, 2007 E.C.R I-8995; Case C-101/05, Skatterverket v.
A, 2007 E.C.R. I-11584; Case C-194/06, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Orange European Smallcap Fund N.V., 2008 E.C.R. I-3819; Case C-274/06, Comm’n v. Spain,
CURIA (February 14, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/docu-
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gives the EU the competence to adopt measures with regard to the
establishment of foreign investors in the EU. This includes the
adoption of internal EU legislation and conclusions of IIAs such as
EU’s FTAs. Further, because the TFEU explicitly covers relations
between member states and third party countries, foreign investors
are able to benefit from important rights vis-à-vis their investments
in the EU. Since SWF investments have to be treated in the same
way as any other FDI, SWFs benefit from the free movement of
capital.112 There are, however, two sets of limits on the principle of
free movement of capital: (1) safeguard clauses, and (2) derogations.
The scope of these limits will determine the room governments have
to maneuver when attempting to restrict FDI in their territories. The
broader these exceptions are, the easier it will be for governments to
limit SWFs’ access to the Common Market. The more narrowly
these limits are conceived, the easier it will be for SWFs to come into
the EU market.
Safeguard clauses are contained in Articles 66 and 75 of the
TFEU. These articles apply only to third countries and are of a
temporary nature, intended for application in exceptional
circumstances.113 The derogations are laid down in Article 64 of the
Lisbon Treaty and Article 65 of the TFEU.114 Article 64 concerns only

ment.jsf?text=&docid=71570&pageIndex=0&doclang=ES&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=898306; Case C326/07, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 35.
112 See generally Torrent, supra note 13, at 1378–99.
113 Source substantiated intent for limited application.
114
See generally Treaty of Lisbon, infra note 125; see also TFEU, supra note 109,
at Article 65. Article 65 states that:
The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States:
(a)to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their
place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested;
(b)to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law
and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential
supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the
declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of
public policy or public security.
2. The provisions of this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on the right of establishment which are compatible
with the Treaties.
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relations with third countries and covers the movements of capital
when regarded as particularly sensitive. These are typically
movements of capital involving direct investment, the right of
establishment, the provision of financial services, or even the
admission of securities to capital markets.
4.2. The exception to the free movement of capital
Article 65 of the TFEU, perhaps the most important article when
it comes to potential obstacles SWFs face to investment in the EU,
describes the powers retained by member states. Specifically, it
enables member states to restrict the movement of capital to or from
other member states or third countries when given grounds as a
matter of ensuring public order or public security.115
Under Article 65, a member state is entitled to restrict Treaty
freedoms on the basis of legitimate national security concerns. Free
movement of capital, unlike the other freedoms of movement
3. The measures and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall
not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Article 63.
115
TFEU, supra note 109, at Article 65(1)(b). The ECJ has expanded the derogations possible to the principle of free movement of capital for a number of “public
interest” reasons. See e.g., Skatteverket v. A., supra note 106 at I-11575 (citing the
need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision); Case C-452/01, Ospelt v.
Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, 2003 E.C.R. I-9790 (citing the need to preserve agricultural communities, maintain a distribution of land ownership which
allows the development of viable farms and sympathetic management of green
spaces and the stateside, encourage a reasonable use of the available land by resisting pressure on land, and prevent natural disasters);
Case C-436/00, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, 2002 E.C.R. I-10864 (citing coherence of
the tax system, prevention of tax avoidance, effectiveness of fiscal supervision, and
maintaining for regional planning purposes, a permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist sector, may be regarded as contributing
to an objective in the public interest). This finding can only be strengthened by the
other concerns which may underlie those same measures. For examples of these
other concerns, see Joined Cases 515, 519, 524, & 526-540/99, Reisch v. Others, 2002
E.C.R. I-2005 (citing the need to protect the environment); Case C-222/97, Trummer
& Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. I-1680 (citing the need to ensure that a mortgage system
clearly and transparently prescribes the respective rights of mortgagees inter se as
well as the rights of mortgagees as a whole vis-à-vis other creditors); Case C302/97, Konle v. Austria, 1999 E.C.R. I-3135 (maintaining, in the general interest, a
permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist sector
in certain regions); Joined Cases C-282 & 283/04, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2006
E.C.R. I-9161 (guaranteeing a universal postal service).
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established by the TFEU, does not apply solely between member
states – it prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital between
member states and third countries. This is true in respect of all
investments, be they from SWFs, state-controlled companies,
private companies or others.
Furthermore, a number of member states have measures in place
that, for example, restrict investments in the defense sector.116 In the
light of the precise and unconditional nature of that Article 65, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Sanz de Lera and Others that
the codified principle of free movement of capital prohibits both
restrictions between member states and between member states and
third countries.117
The list of justification measures in Article 65(1)(b) TFEU is,
however, not exhaustive. Whatever state invokes the coverage of
Article 65(1)(b) on the grounds of ensuring public order or public
security, that state must demonstrate that the means it used do not
go beyond what is necessary to attain the stated end – this essentially
establishes a proportionality test.
In Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income (FII) Group
Litigation case, the ECJ held that it may be the case that a member
state will be able to demonstrate that a restriction on capital
movements to or from third countries is justified for a particular
reason. However, this must be in circumstances where that reason
would not constitute a valid justification for a restriction on capital
movements between member states.118 To this end, the ECJ adopted
in Commission vs. Belgium a test which is based on four criteria. In
substance, the national measures must first aim at the protection of
a legitimate general interest, and, secondly, must foresee strict time
limits for the exercise of opposition rights. Thirdly, the assets or
management decisions targeted must be specifically listed, and,
fourthly, the system’s objective and stable criteria must be subject to
an effective review by the domestic courts.119
116 Several European countries (especially France, Italy, Germany, and Spain)
actually maintain significant controls on foreign investment, such as overall limits
on foreign shareholdings or the need for board members to be national citizens. See
KATINKA BARYSCH & MARINA C. O’DONNELL, FINMECCANICA, SOVEREIGN
INVESTMENTS IN SENSITIVE SERVICES: THE CASE OF DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 27 (2010) (looking at European countries’ controls and restrictions on investment in defense companies, e.g. France and the UK).
117 See generally Sanz de Lera and Others, supra note 110.
118 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, supra note 111, at I-11753.
119 Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809.
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In analyzing whether such restrictions are justified, different
considerations may apply than in the case of purely intraCommunity restrictions.120 For example, as of mid-2015 Article 65
of the TFEU has never been invoked in the context of SWFs. In other
words, no member state has ever adopted a law restricting FDI from
SWFs, nor has a member state ever enforced a decision rejecting an
SWF investment while arguing the validity of the decision as an
exception, under Article 65 of the TFEU, to the principal of freedom
of capital movement under Article 64 of the Treaty of Lisbon. The
infrequent use of Article 65 in this manner does not, however, lessen
the need for a clarification of the scope of Article 65 of the TFEU’s
two exceptions. Because no member state has, as of yet, passed
national-level legislation that would limit the SWFs, it is worthwhile
ensuring that member states will not be tempted to make extensive
use of it. To this end, a short-list of sensitive sectors where
“enhanced scrutiny” is exercised over inflows of funds could be
developed, as the French government has done,121 concerning
whether investment is private or comes from a SWF, subsequently
cementing free entry to all other sectors. Such a short-list could take
the form of a paragraph added to Article 65 of the TFEU.
5. THE SOFT LAW DIMENSION OF THE EU INTERNAL MARKET
Because of such concerns among EU member states, the main
European Institutions – the Council, the Commission, and the
Parliament – decided in 2008 to formulate the basic principles that
should shape the EU approach to SWFs investments in the internal
market. In this respect, a consensus emerged among EU member
states, electing not to create a new mechanism of control ex nihilo.
Rather, members chose to rely on existing rules of the Common
Market that enable member states to derogate from the principle of

120 The reason is that the movements of capital to or from third countries take
place in a different legal context from that which occurs within the Community.
Particularly, the degree of legal integration that exists between member states of
the European Union is not comparable to that of economic activities involving relations between member states and third countries. Test Claimants in the FII Group
Litigation, supra note 111, at I-11831.
121
For a further discussion on the activities of the French government, see
discussion infra Section 6.2.
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freedom of movement of capital.122 In part, the consensus is the
result of the incapacity of member states and the European
Institutions to produce a new framework at the supra-national level.
Confronted with this situation, the EU Institutions demonstrated a
will to formulate an EU approach, albeit a minimal one, which has
all the characteristics of a soft law approach.123
5.1. Design and Main Feature of the EU Common Approach
SWF investment raises concerns because it highlights the
importance of state activity in the global economy, which is
perceived as detrimental to the role of market forces. SWFs may not
make investment decisions for economic reasons, but instead may
choose to invest for political purposes. Further, most countries that
have set up SWFs are located in the developing world. This may
ultimately result in a politicization of capital flows vis-à-vis SWFs.
The range of reasons articulated by host countries for scrutinizing
SWFs and State-Owned Entities (SOEs) more than private investors
is indicated as indicated as follows.
Main Reasons to Scrutinize SWFs more than Private Investors


Fears that countries, as controlling authorities of SWFs, invest in
companies with a view to acquiring ‘know how’ (e.g., dual-use
(civil and military) items and technologies; research, produce or
trade in weapons; intellectual property);



Danger of foreign investment in companies that are directly or
indirectly involved with issues of national security (e.g., wire

122
See generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s
Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013).
123 For a fascinating, highly theoretical treatment of supranational legal standards, specifically the context in which commercial norms may self-standardize, see
Bryan Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a Global Commercial Legal Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1049, 1079-80 (2014) (contending that network effect pressures implicit in trade spontaneously stimulate the
uniformity of legal standards). For earlier work in this vein, see Bryan H. Druzin,
Buying Commercial Law: Choice of law, Choice of Forum, and Network Effect, 18 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 149–56 (2009) (arguing that network effects induce standardization in choice of law and choice of forum clauses in transnational commercial
contracts).
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tapping and mail interception equipment; cryptology services;
activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets);


Danger of foreign ‘political’ investments
dependencies (e.g., in the energy sector; water);



Lack of transparency in the investment policy of SWFs;



The reciprocity issue: How can countries that invest in foreign
companies via SWFs be prompted to adopt a less restrictive
policy with regard to foreign investment in their own country
(e.g., Russia, China and Vietnam)?

that

create

Source: Author, based on concerns frequently mentioned in the political
debate
The European concerns about sovereign investments provide
the background necessary to scrutinize the EU and member state
reactions. Specifically, concerning EU integration, the most
important question to ask is whether or not there is a need to
regulate SWF investment at the international, supra-national (EU),
or domestic level. And, if so, should legislators proceed through
hard or soft law? From a substantive law perspective there are
certain fundamental aspects of SWFs that must be addressed by the
EU such as transparency, governance, and even SWFs investment
criteria.
The proposals and policy initiatives from the stakeholders have
varied widely – from calls for reciprocity in market access and for
increased transparency in investment strategies, to full disclosure of
assets. All these options have their own attendant risks. However,
they each suffer from the fact that they send “a misleading signal –
that the EU is stepping back from its commitment to an open
investment regime. They would also be difficult to reconcile with
EU law and international obligations.”124
For instance, Röller and Véron have called for the EU to establish
a committee on foreign investments that would essentially mirror
arrangements in the United States.125 They have also called for an
EU-wide screening mechanism or some “golden shares”126
See Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at § 4.1.
See Röller & Vérnon, supra note 14, at 7-8.
126
These are non-standard shares, the ownership of which confers special
rights on the holder. Recent landmark decisions of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) regarding compatibility of ‘golden shares’ with EC law are a clear indication
that the concept of ‘golden shares’ violates one of the four fundamental freedoms
124
125
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mechanism for non-EU foreign investment.127 Röller and Vérnon
argue that the EU should draw up legislation to regulate SWFs and
other investment vehicles from emerging economies not classified
as ‘free’ by Freedom House.128 Such a mechanism is not anticipated at
the EU supra-national level because member states wish to retain their
power to screen foreign investments129. This state of affairs may, however,
change in the coming years when the Treaty of Lisbon130 extends the

scope of external trade policy to issues of investment. The
implications of these essential innovations in EU international

conferred on individuals by the EU Treaty, namely the free movement of capital.
The ECJ has held that an actual exercise of any rights attached to a ‘golden share’
by any public body must be based on criteria of non-discrimination and an effective
legal remedy must be guaranteed. However, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on golden
shares does not present a straightforward prohibition of them. Instead, they set out
strong limits on the use of golden shares. For consideration of golden shares under
Belgian law, see Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 O.J. (C 169) 4. For a judgment concerning golden shares under Portuguese law, see Case C-367/98, Comm’n
v. Portugal, 2002 O.J. (C 169) 1 (in the view of the Court, Portugal could not plead
any permissible ground for justification so the ECJ denied the justification in this
case). For a judgment concerning golden shares under French law, see Case C483/99, Comm’n v. France, 2002 O.J. (C 169) 3 (ECJ was confronted with a decree
that allowed the French state, by means of a golden share, to secure influence over
the Société nationale Elf-Aquitaine in such a manner as to require prior approval from
the minister for economic affairs when a person’s ownership in a company, acting
alone or in conjunction with others, exceeded certain percentages of the total capital
or voting rights of that company. As these gave too great a discretion to the decision
makers, given the lack of sufficiently precise and objective criteria for authorization
and consent, the ECJ rejected the justification both with regard to the prior authorization for certain stock acquisitions exceeding the ceilings and the right to oppose
the transfer of certain assets or their use as security). See most recently Case C543/08, Comm’n v. Portugal (Energias de Portugal), 2010 O.J. (C 13)3 (providing
judgment that Portugal’s holding of golden shares in Energias de Portugal is contrary to EU law). See also Case C-98/01, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2003 O.J. (C158) 4 (providing judgment concerning golden shares under English law); Case C174/04, Comm’n v. Italy, 2005 O.J. (C 205) 4; Case C-284/04, Comm’n v. The Netherlands, 2006 O.J. (C 294) 6. For commentary, see Case C-463/00, In re Golden Shares
IV (Comm’n v. Spain), 2003 E.C.R. I-4581 (Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate Gen.)
(stating that share capital constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital
except if those restrictions can be justified). See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign
Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801
(2008).
127 See Röller & Vérnon, supra note 14, at 5.
128 Id. at 2 and 5.
129
See Frederic V. D. Berghe, The EC’s Common Commercial Policy Revisited:
What Does Lisbon Add, 4 GLOBAL TRADE & CUST. J. 277 (2009).
130 Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities, December 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306)
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (came into force on December 1, 2009).
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treaty-making powers, both on the international stage and in EU
bilateral relations, might be significant and raise the question as to
whether or not a US-style Committee on Foreign Investment
(CFIUS) should be established in the EU.131
There is a clear consensus among the EU Institutions concerning
the adoption of a common approach. The Commission took the
initiative in a communication released in February 2008, which was
supported by the European Council and the European Parliament
in March 2008.132 This will be briefly described in the following
paragraph. The substance of the EU approach will be discussed in
the subsequent parts of this article.
The United States and the EU first discussed the question of
SWFs at the meeting of the Transatlantic Economic Council held in
Washington on November 9, 2007. At this meeting, both parties
agreed to formally launch an Investment Dialogue to promote open
investment regimes globally.133 In February 2008, the Commission
presented a communication, titled A Common European Approach to
Sovereign Wealth Funds.134 According to this 2008 Communication,
new legislative measures at the Community level are unnecessary.
The Commission recommended a common approach premised
on five key principles: (1) commitment to an open investment
environment; (2) support of multilateral work; (3) use of existing
instruments; (4) respect of EC Treaty (ECT) obligations and
international commitments; and (5) proportionality and
transparency. Further, the Commission set out some of the options
vis-à-vis regulating SWF operations within the EU common market.
The strategies, data, and general information that funds agree to
make available tend to differ enormously both in terms of scope and
quality. These differences exacerbate the fear that SWF investment
131 Such an interesting research question would however raise a host of other
issues, such as: Which EU institutions should be involved in the screening mechanism? Should the EU’s highest authority in charge of rejecting FDI be the EU Council (subject to unanimity)? Should there be cooperation with National governments?
Which intelligence services in the EU would be capable of alerting EU Institutions?
132
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council ¶¶ 30–36 (March 13–
14, 2008) [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions].
133
As per the Report: “We note the growth of investments by governmentcontrolled investors such as sovereign wealth funds. We welcome commerciallydriven investment from these investors and note the importance of transparent investment policies.” US–EU Summit, June 10, 2008, Brdo, Slovn., Transatlantic Economic Council Report to the E.U.-U.S. Summit 2008, available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/06/20080610-4.html.
134
Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16. Note that Commission
Communications to other EU Institutions are not legally binding.
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could give foreign governments’ excessive political influence over
domestically active firms. Alternatively, if SWFs are transparent and
comply with clear rules of accountability, then the mere fact of stateownership should not give cause for concern. The Commission’s
communication advocates a common European approach based on
cooperation between the countries hosting the SWFs, the funds
themselves, and those responsible for them, all with a view to
establishing “a set of principles ensuring the transparency,
predictability and accountability of SWFs investments.”135 Further,
all investors in the market should have to observe the same set of
regulations that cover competition, the internal market, and
employment law.136 In addition, the various instruments that control
foreign investments that the member states adopt in order to protect
public security, law, and order must not conflict with EU primary
law and directives. Further, the ECJ shall ultimately be the body
tasked with scrutinizing conformity with the aforementioned
principle.137
By issuing the 2008 Communication, the Commission sought to
avoid legislative action. Instead, it strove for soft measures – such as
guidelines – accompanied by efforts at the international level to
increase the transparency of SWFs. Since the Global Financial Crisis,
there has been an increased need to attract liquidity to both Europe
and the United States. In this regard, regulation is hardly the best
response, as few requirements could be usefully imposed on SWFs.
The EU has traditionally been an open investment environment that
promotes a Common Market. The fundamental principle of free
movement of capital, a cornerstone of the Common Market, was
codified in the Treaty on European Union, popularly known as the
Maastricht Treaty.138 The basic tenet of this central principle is that
companies that are authorized to conduct activities in one of the
member countries (the state of origin)139 must be able to sell their
services or establish branches throughout the EU – thereby ensuring
a common and accessible market. It is also important to note that the
Id. at § 4.1.
Id.
137 Id. at § 3.1.
138
Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1. The full liberalization of capital movements in the EU was initially established in the Council
Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L. 178) 5–18.
139 For the scope and definition of the state of origin principle, see Armin Hatie,
Services Directive—A Legal Analysis, 6 EUR. COMMUNITY STUD. ASSOC. AUS. PUB SERIES
1 (discussing the challenge of identifying the state of origin).
135
136
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2008 Communication suggests that the common European approach
is intended to merely complement the regulatory regimes adopted
by member states governing transactions in their particular
jurisdictions.
On March 4, 2008, the Council of the EU140 held an exchange of
views on issues relating to SWFs,141 with the purpose of furthering
the discussion by the European Council142 at its spring meeting
(March 13–14, 2008). The delegates agreed on the need for the EU to
form a common position, as a means of ensuring that their shared
objectives are met through the work of international fora. They
further agreed that commitments by SWFs, in particular with regard
to the separation of the management of SWFs from political
authorities, should be central to any agreement at the global level.
Ultimately, they determined that if international negotiations did
not develop satisfactorily, further action should be considered at the
EU level.
The European Council adopted the ideas set out by the
Commission, clarifying two of the five principles encapsulated in
the 2008 Communication. The Council’s position differed in that,
rather than expressing its support for the multilateral approach in
general, it commented specifically on the work underway in the IMF
and the OECD. Further, rather than referring to the use of the
existing instruments, and once again taking a more general
approach, the European Council thought it more appropriate to
adopt use of national instruments and EU instruments.
At the Spring Summit on March 13 and 14, 2008, the European
Council welcomed the Commission’s communications on SWFs.143
While taking into account national prerogatives, the European
Council agreed on the need for a common European approach in
line with the five principles proposed by the Commission, namely:
(1) commitment to an open investment environment; (2) support for
ongoing work in the IMF and the OECD; (3) use of national and EU
140 The Council of the EU (also known as the Council of Ministers) is the EU’s
main decision-making body and has legislative power, which it shares with the European Parliament.
141
Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs, 2857th
Council meeting, 7192/08, March 4, 2008.
142
The European Council is the supreme body of the European Union, the
highest political representatives (Prime Ministers or Presidents) from all member
states attend the Council’s meetings. The European Council is responsible for defining the general political direction and priorities of the Union.
143 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 132.
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instruments if necessary; (4) respect for EC Treaty obligations and
international commitments; and (5) proportionality and
transparency. The European Council supported the objective of
forming a consensus at the international level on a voluntary Code
of Conduct for SWFs and defining principles for the recipient
countries. In this respect, they reiterated the EU’s “support for [the]
ongoing work in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the
OECD”.144 There was a clear rejection of a Europe-wide screening
mechanism that would echo the system in the United States.
With the aim of providing coordinated input to this ongoing
debate, the European Council invited145 the Commission and the
Council of the EU to continue their work along these lines, stressing
the importance of a common EU approach to SWFs during debate at
the international level. However, the European Council also
strongly insisted that governments should be allowed to “make use
of national and EU instruments if necessary” to counter foreign
investments not justified for commercial reasons.146
The European Parliament (EP) welcomed the 2008
Communication. The EP expressed its concern that:
[T]he lack of transparency of certain SWFs may not allow an
accurate understanding of their structure and motivation
requests the Commission to acknowledge the fact that
transparency and disclosure are the key principle for the
establishment of a truly level playing field and the smooth
running of markets in general.147
Somewhat earlier in the year, the EP had stated that the FTA,
with the Gulf Cooperation Council, should seek to “promote
increased transparency and accountability with regard to
investments made by sovereign wealth funds”.148
Likewise, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
added its support for the European Commission’s proposal. The
EESC underscored that “the Commission should work together
with the Member States and the supervisory authorities to improve
Id. at ¶ 36.
Id.
146 Id.
147
Resolution on Sovereign Wealth Funds, EUR. PARL. DOC.NO. P6_TAPROV(2008)0355 (2008) at ¶E (translation from French).
148
Resolution on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council, EUR. PARL. DOC. NO. P6_TA(2008)0355
(2008), at ¶ E12.
144
145
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the transparency of these funds, understand their motives, and
make sure they are not pursuing political objectives”.149 Prior to
2008, the EESC had noted that generally it “would urge the
Commission to present, as soon as possible, its draft legislative
provisions aimed at stepping up the information provided by
institutional investors with regard to their policies in respect of
investment and voting”.150
5.2. The EU’s Support for a Multilateral Regulation
The first important feature of the EU approach towards SWFs is
its support for multilateral solutions. This approach has been
accepted and supported by all EU Institutions. Because SWFs are
conceptualized as a global phenomenon rather than simply an intranational one, the EU perspective is that binding regulation needs to
happen at a level above the EU itself. Given SWFs’ international
scope, the EU cooperates with other hosts on the one hand, and with
SWFs and those responsible for them on the other. The European
approach – the proposal encapsulated in the 2008 Communication
and supported by all the other European Institutions –
acknowledges this analysis and is well in-line with the EU’s
historical preference for multilateral bodies having a unilateral
approach. Ultimately, the analytical inroad taken by the EU is
important because it provides support for the work by the IMF and
the OECD.
Unilateral action by the EU could be disastrous for many
reasons. Obviously, it can be seen as, or even strategically argued
that it is, necessarily, a protectionist policy. Further, unilateral
actions have the potential to proliferate, contributing to the creation
of a multitude of irreconcilable standards across jurisdictions. This
could impose undue compliance costs on SWFs, which would in
turn affect the efficient flow of capital.
For the aforementioned reasons, some argue that it not
opportune to adopt a narrow European approach. Rather, the 2008
Communication seeks an international and global solution. The EU
is thus playing an active role in ensuring that the work of the
149
Opinion of the Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Social Cohesion, European and Social Committee, on ‘Financial Integration: The Case of European Stock Markets’, CESE 283/2008 ¶ 1.5, available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.eco-opinions.14069.
150
Opinion of the Section for Single Market, Production and Consumption,
European Economic and Social Committee, on ‘Review of the Single Market’ ¶
1.1.15, 2007 O.J. (C 93).
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multilateral bodies moves forward. The Commission strives
towards finding a code of conduct that would be developed at the
global level both by the host countries and the SWFs themselves. A
voluntary code of conduct that enshrines basic standards for
governance and transparency would ensure greater clarity in the
functioning of SWFs. The 2008 Communication clearly recognizes
the import of “obtain[ing] greater clarity and insight into the
governance of SWFs . . . . [and] deliver[ing] greater transparency on
their activities and investments”.151
In October 2007, the G7 Finance Ministers made a call for major
multilateral organizations to reflect upon the growing role of SWFs
and regulatory issues. The G7 specifically mentioned the IMF and
the OECD.152 Since March 2008, when the Council signaled its
support for this approach, the Commission has been actively
involved in the work of the IMF and the OECD concerning the
establishment of SWF best practices.153 Since the G7 summit, the
activities of the IMF and the OECD have run parallel and, while they
are not dealing with exactly the same themes, they are generally
complementary. The OECD Working Group’s efforts have
complemented the above – they have attempted to determine how
host countries should respond to the SWFs investments. It has more
or less determined that most host countries want to identify the best
practice with respect to SWF investment frameworks, building on

Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at § 4.3.
Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank of Governors, Washington, D.C. (October 19, 2007), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm071019.htm. In the statement, the G7/8 Finance Ministers noted that:
151
152

Cross-border, market-based investment is a major contributor to robust
global growth. In this context, we agreed that sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs) are increasingly important participants in the international financial system and that our economies can benefit from openness to SWF investment flows. We see merit in identifying best practices for SWFs in such
areas as institutional structure, risk management, transparency and accountability. For recipients of government-controlled investments, we
think it is important to build on principles such as nondiscrimination,
transparency, and predictability . . . . We ask the IMF, World Bank, and
OECD to examine these issues.
153
Since 1960, the Commission of the European Community has had quasimember status with the OECD. The members of the EC delegation thus sit in on the
OECD’s various specialized committees that monitor the work of the Secretariat.
Further, the signatory states decided that the Commission of the European Community “shall take part in the work” of the OECD. OECD, Convention on the
OECD, December 14, 1960.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

624

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:2

the key principles of non-discrimination, accountability,
transparency, and predictability.154
At the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris, the Ministers
adopted the OECD’s Declaration on SWFs and Recipient State
Policies. The Declaration reiterated, “SWFs have become a key player
in the new financial”.155 The Ministers formally recognized the
financial benefits that SWFs bring to the home and the host
economies. Such a statement clearly implies that protectionist
barriers to foreign investments, be they from SWFs or otherwise,
would hamper the growth which is vital to many economies. They
underscored the value of the Investment Committee report on
SWFs, which should guide the investment policies of recipient
countries with a view to preserve and even expand an environment
for SWFs that is as open as possible, while protecting national
security interests.
The OECD’s Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient
State Policies was published in October 2008.156 These guidelines
draw on the OECD’s extensive work on the treatment of foreign
investment in the OECD economies. OECD work also draws on the
2005 OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance of State Owned
Enterprises.157 The OECD guidance on host state policies regulating
SWFs plays a pivotal role in shaping the fundamental principle of
non-discrimination. Ultimately, governments should be guided by
the principle of non-discrimination when making decisions on SWF
investment, as well as by the principles of transparency, regulatory
proportionality, and accountability.
Another important issue is that of investment reciprocity.
Currently, there are concerns about both the quantity and quality of
restrictions on investments which EU firms may face when they
want to invest abroad, such as in China or Russia. This ultimately
poses the question: How can countries that invest in foreign
companies via SWFs be moved to adopt less restrictive policies
154 For dissection of the work of the OECD, see Edwin M. Truman, OECD Guidance on Sovereign Wealth Funds: Still Falling Short (2008), available at
http://www.piie.com/realtime/?p=189 (praising the OECD for their improved
treatment of SWFs but expressing continuing disappointment that they did not
“move further to strengthen the openness of their investment regimes”).
155
OECD, DECLARATION ON SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND RECIPIENT STATE
POLICIES 1 (2008) [hereinafter GUIDELINES 2008].
156 Id.
157
OECD, GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED
ENTERPRISES 1
(2005)
[hereinafter
GUIDELINES 2005],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf.
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concerning foreign investment in their own countries?
Luxembourg’s Finance Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has led the
charge in the EU, clearly tying his resistance to SWFs from Russia to
fears concerning investment reciprocity. Juncker has stated that it is
unacceptable for the Russian government’s fund to be welcomed in
the Common Market while European companies are unable to
undertake similar activities in Russia.158 Further, Juncker has argued
that the EU should respect the principle of reciprocity and that it
would be dangerous to leave everything up to the market.159 He has
gone on to say that it is necessary to take strong political action to
strengthen surveillance and to ensure transparency in financial
markets.160
Some countries that sponsor SWFs impose severe restrictions on
Inward Foreign Direct investment (IFDI) by individuals and firms
from the EU and other OECD countries such as Russia and China.
Ultimately, the prerogative of SWFs to invest a large portion of their
assets in the EU creates an opportunity to press restrictive home
countries to open up their respective economies to inward foreign
investment. Currently, the EU wants to ensure that there is a level
playing field across every aspect of economic cooperation – with
particular attention to the energy sector as a prime area of
cooperation between the EU and Russia. Whereas Russia wants each
sphere to be treated separately in terms of volumes of
investments.161
Furthermore, both the European Commission and the European
Council have stressed the necessity of guaranteeing independence
of management, as well as transparency of both ownership structure
and the interests of SWFs.162 Discussions about SWFs and their
investments in the EU can potentially create leverage to limit
Russian investments in the EU if the EU’s views on reciprocity are
not taken into account. Because many SWFs are located in countries
158
Robert Amsterdam, Europe Wary of Russia’s Sovereign Wealth (2008) (quoting
Juncker),
available
at
http://robertamsterdam.com/2008/02/europe_wary_of_russias_sovereign_wealth_funds/.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161
Edwin M. Truman et al., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION
67 (2010).
162
See Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16 (outlining the EU approach to SWFs and its attempt to encourage them while managing the concerns
they raise); see also Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs,
2857th Council meeting, 7192/08, March 4, 2008 (stating the EU’s desire to establish
a common approach to SWFs and their intention to do so at a later meeting).
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that are financially less open to foreign investment than typical
OECD countries, the immediate effect of a strict application of the
reciprocity principle could be to place strong limitations on some
SWFs’ investment.
During OECD discussions on SWFs, the European Commission
did not offer any proposals speaking to its previously discussed
interest in reciprocity. One reason why the EC did not include any
proposals addressing reciprocity is perhaps linked to the fact that
the EU is the biggest international investor.163 Thus, there would be
no significant gain for EU investors as they already seem to have
secured adequate access to foreign markets. Further, the reciprocity
requirement could potentially be interpreted as negative – demands
for reciprocity could potentially be perceived as an excuse for
engaging in protectionism. Restricting investment risks retribution
from countries with SWFs – this includes Russia and China, where
European companies are active. Further, avoiding reciprocity has
been an important OECD policy prerogative – as a result, OECD
guidance on host state policies covering SWF investment does not
include any demand for reciprocity.164
The European Community is not a member of the IMF. However
“the creation of the euro [(€)] gave a strong impetus to” 165
coordinate policy with the IMF. Thus, EU member states have “set
up a multi-layered structure of coordination, composed of a
Brussels-based committee” 166 and an informal group of member
states’ officials who meet in Washington, D.C.167 This system, driven
by the United States and the EU, strives to draw up a code of best
practice that includes a renunciation of political motives; however,
it has stirred resentment among some countries with SWFs,

163
By 2014, the EU’s outward FDI totaled US$ 3.88 trillion, down from US$
9.15 trillion, while EU inward FDI amounted to US$ 3.6 trillion, down from US$
5.36 trillion. See most recent data from UNCTAD data July 2015, available at
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/.
164
The OECD instruments are based on the philosophy that liberalization is
beneficial to all, especially countries that undergo liberalization. E.g., GUIDELINES
2008, supra note 155.
165
ADS INSIGHT, EUROPEAN COORDINATION AT THE WORLD BANK AND
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A QUESTION OF HARMONY? 8 (2006), available at
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/eurodad%20euifigovernance.pdf.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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particularly in China and some Gulf countries.168 This code was
criticized at the 2008 World Economic Forum, where representatives
of some of the Gulf funds deemed it both unnecessary and intrusive,
as “the investment funds had never done anything to arouse
suspicion”.169 Similarly, “Chinese officials have also been quoted as
saying that the best practice idea [is] unnecessary”.170
The IMF’s challenge from the onset has been to find the best way
to advance calls for increased SWF disclosure. This concern has
gained traction in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. The IMF
has, inter alia, wrestled with determining the best way of addressing
calls for increased SWF disclosure. This issue cannot simply be
framed as a threat to withdraw the privilege of investing in Western
markets. Ultimately, many countries with large SWFs are tired of
being lectured to. Further, given global imbalances and the funding
needs of a capitalist economic system, such threats are likely to be
ineffective. In the same vein, the International Working Group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) has had to overcome objections by
members that articulate the fear that the adoption of any set of
principles will in effect validate overarching concerns vis-à-vis the
activities of SWFs. Ultimately, SWFs have been reluctant to adopt
practices that put them at a comparative disadvantage with other
investors, particularly concerning the confidentiality of their
investments.171
In October 2008, despite the difficulties described above, the IMF
issued a set of twenty-four voluntary principles, popularly known
as the Santiago Principles, for SWFs to follow. These Principles
168
See Suwaidi Critical of IMF Attempt to Monitor SWF Investments in West,
EMIRATES 24/7, May 9, 2008, available at http://www.emirates247.com/2.291/suwaidi-critical-of-imf-attempt-to-monitor-swf-investments-in-west-2008-05-091.226998. (reporting that “[t]he UAE [United Arab Emirates] has criticized the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its decision to interfere in the activities of the
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), branding it a politically motivated move. Central
Bank Governor Sultan bin Nassir Al Suwaidi said the IMF lacks sufficient experience in such issues and its involvement following Western pressure could discourage further SWF investment in the United States . . . . Al Suwaidi’s address was on
behalf of the UAE and other Arab central bank governors representing their countries at the meeting. The states he represented included Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Syria, and Yemen.”).
169
Steven R. Weisman, Government Funds Promise to Avoid ‘Geopolitical Goals’,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
21,
2008.,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-sovereign.1.11312313.html.
170 Id.
171
Mehmet Caner & Thomas J. Grennes, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Norwegian Experience, 33 THE WORLD ECON. 597 (2010) [hereinafter Caner & Grennes].
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address some of the concerns raised by host countries while
ensuring SWFs’ competitiveness in global financial markets.172 The
Santiago Principles encourage SWFs to explain their investment
criteria173 as well as recommend that host countries set-up
investment policies for the SWFs, so that they can avoid buying
stakes in sensitive companies,174 such as Western defense
contractors. At the same time that the IMF approved the Santiago
Principles, the IWG also voted to create a standing committee
charged with updating the Santiago Principles over time as well as
liaising with Western governments and institutions, such as the
World Bank and IMF, on issues of concern.175 The Santiago Principles
make repeated reference to the need for greater transparency.176 The
Principles include recommendations that sovereign funds coordinate
their activities with their respective governments and central banks
to avoid interfering with domestic economic policy.177 Further, they
urge SWFs to disclose their sources of funding as well as the
conditions under which their controlling authorities can withdraw
the committed funds.178 They also urge SWFs to ensure that SWF
managers are independent of the fund-controlling authorities, but
fully accountable, e.g., that they publish annual reports and undergo
annual audits.179
Throughout the IMF negotiations the EU’s position mainly
covered issues of transparency and governance. As reported by the
European Commission, “[s]ince SWFs are managed independently
INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3
(2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf
[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES].
173
Id. at 4, 22-23 (explaining Principle 21 and the purpose of the GAPP [Generally Accepted Principles and Practices]).
174 Id. at 20, (Principle 18 explains that the investment policy should give guidance on the SWF’s risk tolerance by covering topics such as: permissible asset classes, investment parameters, “concentration risk with regard to individual holdings,
liquidity, and geographical and sectoral concentration”, and strategic asset allocation).
175 IMF, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the "Santiago Principles" to the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Press Release
No. 08/06, Washington, D.C., October 11, 2008.
176
See, e.g., SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 172 (referencing the need for
greater transparency 14 times in total).
177
SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 172, at 11 (Section A: Legal Framework,
Objectives and Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies).
178 Id. at 13 (Principle 4).
179 Id. at 16 (Principle 9).
172

FUNDS
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from a state’s foreign exchange reserves, they are excluded from
transparency mechanisms such as the IMF maintains for foreign
exchange reserves . . . .”180 However, looking at the available data on
SWFs, an SWF’s general lack of transparency has some correlation
with whether the government controlling the fund is democratic or
autocratic.181 Democratic governments typically have to meet, in
their governance and in their institutions, transparency standards
that dictatorships do not. But because a fair number of countries
with SWFs can be considered ‘non-democratic,’ SWFs’ general lack
of transparency makes host countries fear that non-commercial
strategic, political, and social factors may overwhelmingly inform
their investment decisions. Transparency, as stipulated by the
Commission, can be understood as a requirement for the publication
of statistics and data as follows.
Transparency as Suggested by the EU Approach


Transparency practices that could be considered would include:
o Annual disclosure of investment positions and asset
allocation, in particular for investments for which there is
majority ownership;
o Exercise of ownership rights;
o Disclosure of the use of leverage and of the currency
composition;
o Size and source of an entity’s resources;
o Disclosure of the home state regulation and oversight
governing the SWF.

Source: Author’s elaboration on principles and policies encapsulated by the
2008 Communication, supra note 1.
The Santiago Principles have been taken into account very
seriously by the EU. Notably, the EU-Singapore FTA gives special
attention to SWFs, which are included in the Institutional, General
and Final Provisions Chapters. Article 17.8 of the FTA indicates
"[e]ach Party shall encourage its sovereign wealth funds to respect
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices – Santiago
Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at 10.
Sovereign Wealth Funds, Foreign Policy Consequences in an Era of New Money:
Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 110th Cong. 9–10 (2008), (prepared statement of Jagdish Bhagwati, Senior Fellow, Int’l Economics, Council on Foreign Relations).
180
181
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Principles."182 This is important, as the soft law rules developed by
the IMF are now incorporated in a binding treaty signed by the EU
and may further encourage parties to respect the international
guidelines.
More generally, the criteria mentioned in the EU approach are
fundamental because they could serve to effectively reinforce the
transparency requirement. The Singaporean SWFs, Temasek, and
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) were the
first SWFs set up by national governments and both are notorious
for their lack of transparency.183 Their main purpose was to recycle
Singapore foreign reserves through state investment vehicles with a
goal of underpinning an overall vision of national economic
development.184 Temasek in particular has been exporting this
strategic investment approach overseas; the Singaporean approach
has been a major influence on China’s emerging overseas
investment strategy.185
It is tempting to also refer to successful models that have proved
to be even more transparent. One such example is the Norwegian
Pension Fund (NPF), which is often held up as the benchmark for
higher transparency and governance. Information on its global
performance and risk exposure is reported quarterly and its
holdings in approximately 3,500 companies are detailed
annually186— in most cases, its investment in any one company
amounts to less than 1% of available shares.187 The NPF does not
seek to control companies through buy-outs. By its own rules the
fund restricts its ownership in any company it invests in by limiting
182
European Commission, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (June 29,
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961.
183 Id. at 10.
184
Garry Rodan et al., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA: AN
INTRODUCTION 1 (2006).
185
See, e.g., John Burton, Singapore’s Wealth Fund Flattered by Imitation, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a50515c-5b4b11dc-8c32-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3pYLhsCf6.
186 Norwegian Pension Fund Public reporting obligations are detailed in Government Pension Fund Act (no. 123 of December 21, 2005). The Act is further detailed by supplementary provisions on the management of the Government Pension Fund, especially Section 7-1: Public reports on the management of the Fund
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/the-guidelines-for-the-management-of-the.html?id=434605#7
(last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
187 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2010, at 10 and 38 available at http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/2011/NBIM_2010_eng.pdf.
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the acquisition of any rights to 10% of the outstanding shares.188
Thus, the NPF’s investment objectives are purely financial in nature
and focused on safeguarding assets for the long term.189
Another prime example is the Irish National Pension Reserve
Fund (INPRF), which publishes its investment strategy in an annual
report.190 Although relatively modest, as of mid-2015 it has assets
totaling approximately USD 20.8 billion, the INPRF publishes its
investment strategy every quarter. These quarterly publications
detail its investment conduits and agents, as well as an audited
annual report of its holdings in every company. Commitment to
publications such as these is fundamental to any measure of
transparency; it ensures that both the information regarding the
shares which a fund holds as well as the strategy which the fund
employs is readily available.
However, beyond requirements of transparency, issues
concerning the nature of state influence on SWFs are bound to
surface. For example, a powerful state may establish a degree of
order in business and state affairs. In such a case, a formal
requirement of transparency will lead to actual transparency.
However, this situation is different in Middle Eastern countries191
and in Russia192 where the states are perhaps not capable of
guaranteeing that there will be no problems, notably because of the
limits of the rule of law.
In any case, transparency cannot be unilateral—the ideal
equation requires a bilateral process. For SWFs themselves, clarity
188 The Ministry of Finance decided to increase the limit on ownership stakes
from the initial 5% to 10%, but that does not alter the NPFP’s role as a financial
investor. Indeed, on average in 2010, the Fund owned considerably less than 1% of
each company in the portfolio. Id.
189 See generally Caner & Grennes, supra note 171.
190 For annual reports on the Irish National Pension Reserve Fund see ANNUAL
REPORTS, IRISH NAT’L PENSION RESERVE FUND 1, available at http://www.nprf/Publications/annualReports.htm (last visited July 28, 2015).
191
See Eugene Cotran et al., THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE
ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (2000) (explaining
that the rule of law is still at an embryonic stage in the Middle East and that the
2011 upheaval sweeping the Middle East was driven by the people’s demand for a
voice in the decisions that affect their lives and for a society that abides by the rule
of law).
192
The issue in Russia is not the existence of the laws, which actually are numerous and well drafted, but rather the need to improve judicial institutions (lack
of respect for courts decisions, subsequent shortcomings in implementing laws, and
corruption). See generally Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37
GEO. J. INT’L L. 353 (2006).
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will mean stability and will reduce the risk of serious setbacks. For
those national economies in which the SWFs are investing, a stable,
predictable, and non-discriminatory framework will eliminate the
risk of important investors voting with their feet—in other words,
leaving Europe and investing elsewhere. The EU approach could
further gain in popularity if it is revised to place a greater emphasis
on the reasons undergirding the need for transparency.
In terms of governance, some international standards already
exist. For example, the IMF’s Guidelines for Foreign Exchange
Reserve Management lay down important principles that could be
extended to SWFs.193 Likewise, the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises put forward principles
relevant for SWFs that undertake cross-border investments194 as
underscored by the European Commission communication on
SWFs.195
Additionally, it has been observed that “SWFs do not meet the
standards set by local financial institutions, which demand rigid
governance structures and disclosure. As a result, we can infer that
if SWFs align their governance practices with those of the local
financial institutions, legitimacy would be granted.”196
The standards for SWFs should clearly set out: (1) the role of the
government as well as the managers of the investment mechanism;
(2) the entity to set the policies; and (3) ultimately provide
benchmarks for accountability measures and how those policies are
executed. In its approach, the EU has identified four principles of
good governance as follows.
EU Principles of Good Governance Applicable to SWFs


Principles of good governance include:
o The clear allocation and separation of responsibilities in the
internal governance structure of a SWF (e.g., operational

193
INT’L MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
MANAGEMENT
1
(2001),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/ferm/eng/index.htm.
194 GUIDELINES 2005, supra note 157.
195 Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at 9.
196
Ashby Monk, RECASTING THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND DEBATE: TRUST,
LEGITIMACY, AND GOVERNANCE 13 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. For the Env’t Working Papers
in Emp’t, Work and Fin. No. WPG08-14, 2008) (providing a case study of the China
Investment Corporation and ultimately criticizing it in the quoted conceptualization of how governance affects and is informed by legitimacy).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/3

2015]

DEMYSTIFYING SECURITY EXCEPTION

633

autonomy of the SWF; disclosure of the general principles of
internal governance that provide assurances of integrity);
o The development and issuance of an investment policy that
defines the overall objectives of SWF investment (e.g.,
disclosure of investment positions; disclosure of the currency
composition of investments; operational autonomy to achieve
SWF defined objectives);
o The disclosure of the general principles governing a SWF’s
relationship with governmental authority (essentially the
separation of the management of SWF from political
authorities); and
o The development and issuance of risk-management policies
(e.g., policies, procedures and models used by the risk
managers).
Source: Author’s understanding of the principles and policies enunciated
in Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16.
6. ASSESSING THE RISKS OF EUROPEAN PROTECTIONISM
The recurring debate concerning SWFs may suggest that there
are few rules that are presently in place to regulate them. However,
this is not the case. As underscored in its 2008 Communication, EU
law provides a comprehensive regime to regulate both the
establishment and the actions of foreign investors, which ultimately
“covers SWFs in exactly the same way as any other foreign
investor.”197 This regime has not been weakened by the Treaty of
Lisbon.198 Further, the TFEU provides the EU with the legal
framework and tools necessary to meet future challenges.199
Recent experience shows that the opaque structures of some
SWFs’ risk prompting defensive reactions from host countries. In
2008, the Italian government announced that SWFs wanting to buy
shares in Italian companies should generally stay below 5%,
suggesting that a new law would be passed to this effect. 200 This was
Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at 7 (§ 3.1).
Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 130.
199 Herein we adopt the renumbering of provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. TFEU, supra note 109.
200
Guy Dinmore, Italy Set to Curb Sovereign Wealth Funds FIN. TIMES Oct. 21,
2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1709cf92-9f09-11dd-98bd000077b07658.html#axzz3pYLhsCf6.
197
198
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a reaction to the purchase by Libya, a former Italian colony, of a
4.23% stake in the second largest Italian bank, UniCredit SpA.201
However, shortly after this announcement, Foreign Minister Franco
Frattini said that there is no need for a threshold, but rather that
there is need for transparency.202 Such an abrupt change in direction
can be interpreted as the abandonment of any plan to pass a new
domestic law (confirmed by the fact that, since 2008, no relevant
change in Italian law has occurred), and to refer to the multilateral
approach supported at the supranational level by the EU. In fact,
Italy waited until March 2012 before deciding to introduce a new
law that gives special power to review foreign investment to the
Government.203 The law distinguishes between two sectors, which
receive different types of scrutiny and consequences. The law does
not define the sectors clearly but requires that the government
specify which are the strategic security activities for the defense
sector204 and which are the networks, power-plants and assets of
strategic relevance for the energy, transportation and
communications a minimum of every three years.205 In the case of a
real threat to the essential interests of defense and national security,
the government can impose conditions with respect to the security
of the procurements, transfer of technology, etc.,206 veto mergers and
acquisitions,207 and oppose the transfer of ownership of shares from
a company that operates in strategic activities relevant for the
national security to entities that might acquire ownership and
voting rights in order to compromise defense and national
security.208 The government can also veto board and shareholder
decisions or transactions that pose a serious threat to the public
interest in the safety and operation of the networks and plants, and
to the continuity of the procurement of the service.209 At this stage,
Id.
No Need to Cap Sovereign Fund Holdings, REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2008, available at
http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/10/23/italy-funds-frattini-idINRAT00420320081023.
203
Law decree 21/2012 amended and converted into law L. 11 maggio 2012,
n. 56, GAZZETTA UFFICIALE, May 11, 2012, available at http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/gunewsletter/dettaglio.jsp?service=1&datagu=2012-0315&task=dettaglio&numgu=63&redaz=012G0040&tmstp=1332753773322.
204 Id. at Art. 1.
205 Id. at Art. 2.
206 Id. at Art. 1, comma 1.
207 Id. at Art. 1, comma 2.
208 Id. at Art. 1, comma 3.
209 Id. at Art. 2, comma 3.
201
202
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the analyzed provisions do not seem to create a serious protectionist
barrier to foreign investors because the law has been enforced in
many operations involving State-Controlled Entities (SCEs) have
occurred in Italy.210
The United Kingdom and France, however, have already
introduced legislation that would allow them to fend off
investments from SWFs.211 Germany passed a new law that came
into force in April 2009. All three examples are further explored
below.
We think that any discussion of foreign investment by SWFs
must recognize the differences in investment objectives between
different types of SCEs.212 These differences in investment objectives
justify, at the European level, permitting countries to adopt minimal
safeguard provisions. Accommodating for such minimal safeguard
provisions would provide a means of oversight for the few
exceptional cases, and filter out possible threats to national security
interests. In other words, the twenty-seven member states of the EU
should have the power to block investments only in sensitive,
security-related sectors. Restricting the flow of capital for other
reasons will lead to infringement proceedings launched by the
Commission against any member state that fails to comply with EU
law and regulations.213
Such national measures should not contradict the common
European approach advocated by the Commission on the basis of
210 See Mubadala Completes 100% Takeover of Piaggio, ARABIAN AEROSPACE, Sept.
18, 2015, available at http://www.arabianaerospace.aero/mubadala-completes100-takeover-of-piaggio.html (reporting that the Mubadala Development Company has acquired total control of Piaggio Aereo SpA); Francesca Landini, CDP
Inks Final Deal to Sell Italy's Grid Assets to China, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/27/italy-china-grid-assetsidUSI6N0T002220141127 (reporting that the State Grid corporation of China has
signed a preliminary agreement for the acquisition of 35% shares in CDP Reti).
211 In the UK, Enterprise Act of 2002, 2002, c. 40 (U.K.) [hereinafter Enterprise
Act] (stating multi fair competition related objects and purposes of the Act . In
France, Décret 2005-1739, infra note 230. In Germany, Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung vom
[Thirteenth Law Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Act], April 18, 2009,
BGBL. I at 1150 (Ger.),
available at http://www.hohmann-partner.com/rechtsvorschriften/2010/awg_englisch-2009.pdf. Both were enacted as of
mid-2011.
212 Greene & Yeager, supra note 43, at 247.
213
Article 258 TFEU regulates the infringement proceedings against a Member State, which in the opinion of the Commission infringes Community law. The
Commission can try to bring the infringement to an end, and, if necessary, may
refer the case to the ECJ.
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the principles supported by the European Council. All national
measures must be envisaged in the context of a common European
approach, which they should complement. Europe must avoid any
uncoordinated responses that could send the wrong message about
the EU stepping back from its commitment to being a welcoming
environment for investments.
For these reasons there is a need for the Commission to analyze
the existing initiatives, establish effective coordination, and ensure
that that coordination does not encroach upon national prerogatives
and competences in terms of protection. This analysis of European
practices should be undertaken and directed by the European
Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs. We will detail existing laws in three countries of the EU: the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These three countries
appear to be the most relevant examples because they are the main
destinations for investment within the EU, while simultaneously
being three important actors in the decision-making process within
the EU. Whether or not a United States-style regime—encapsulated
by the CFIUS—should be established in the EU, any such decision
would require the support of these three countries.
6.1. Control of foreign takeovers in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, corporate M&As can, in principle, be
reviewed for the purpose of protecting investors and ensuring fair
competition through the Enterprise Act of 2002.214 A merger
situation can be considered under the competition legislation if
either or both of the following tests are satisfied: (1) an acquisition
of a UK enterprise valued in excess of £70 million, or (2) the resulting
combined business will account for more than 25% of a supply
market of a good or service within the United Kingdom or a
substantial part of it. The substantive test applied to the merger is
whether it may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of
competition as a result of the transaction.215
The government can intervene in M&As in areas of national
security and the media if acquisition is deemed to be against the
214
See Enterprise Act, supra note 212 (stating multi fair competition related
objects and purposes of the Act); see generally Cosmo Graham, The Enterprise Act
2002 and Competition Law, 67 MOD. L. REV. 273 (2004) [hereinafter Graham].
215 See Graham, supra note 215, at 277.
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public interest.216 Among many other things,217 the Enterprise Act
2002 makes the United Kingdom’s Competition Commission
determinative in merger cases and in market investigations—which
replace the complex monopoly investigations established under the
Fair Trading Act 1973—and which change the substantive question
for these investigations. While the inquiry used to be whether
particular matters operate or might operate against the public
interest,218 the Enterprise Act of 2002 changes the inquiry to turn on
one of four tests. The first is a qualified public interest test, which
applies in cases that raise specific public interest issues (e.g., national
security or media).219 The second is a test of prejudice in the context of
water enterprises, which is applied by the Office of Water Supply’s
ability to make comparisons between water enterprises in the
context of mergers between water companies.220 This test is
particularly relevant in relation to increasing investment by SWFs in
the water services sector.221 The third test is a substantial lessening of
competition test. It applies to all other mergers not covered by the first
two tests.222 The final test is an adverse effects on competition test. This

216
See Enterprise Act, supra note 212, at § 58 (U.K.) (stating the statutory provisions for the United Kingdom’s merger regime); The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008, 2008, SI 2008/2645
(adding the category ‘the interest of maintaining the stability of the UK financial
system’ as a new consideration.); Dep’t for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform press notice, 2008, s42(3) (confirming the intention to amend the Act and empowering it to instruct the Office of Fair Trading to report on its assessment of the
merger to the Secretary of State). NB: The department was created on June 28, 2007
on the disbanding of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and was itself
disbanded on June 6, 2009 on the creation of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/departmentfor-business-innovation-skills.
217
See generally Daniel Prentice, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Enterprise Act
2002, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. R. 153 (2004).
218 The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008, 2008, SI 2008/2645.
219 Enterprise Act, supra note 200, at §§ 58(A)–(C).
220 Id. at § 89 (1).
221
Thames Water Holding Plc., the company that provides water and sewerage services in the areas of London, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Gloucestershire,
Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey and Wiltshire, has among its shareholders China Investment Corporation and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, holding almost nine and
ten percent, respectively. China’s CIC Buys 8.68% Stake in U.K.’s Thames Water Utilities, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 20, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-20/china-s-cic-acquires-8-68-stake-in-u-k-sthames-water-utilities.
222 Id. at §§ 47, 63.
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test applies in market investigations where it is believed that market
features have an adverse effect on competition.223
Even if traditionally more liberal than continental Europe, the
United Kingdom, through its Chancellor, Alistair Darling at the time
of writing this Article, supported the pursuit of the G7 to toughen
its stance towards SWFs.224 Darling warned foreign governments
that the United Kingdom would not tolerate politically motivated
investments in key UK companies. These comments were intended
as a warning to Russia that the United Kingdom would not tolerate
Russia’s state-owned energy company taking a stake in Centrica, the
majority shareholder of British Gas.225 The Russian state-owned gas
and oil conglomerate, GazProm who already supplies around a
quarter of the EU gas demand and has re-acquired most of the
pipelines running from Central Asia to Europe, would not be a
welcome bidder for United Kingdom gas grid operator Centrica.
6.2. Control of foreign takeovers in France
In 2004 France modified its Monetary and Financial Code.226 The
new Article L 151-3 strictly limits the field of control to the reasons
expressly indicated in Article 346 of the TFEU (national defense)227
and Article 65-1 (public order and public security). Following the
2005 rumor of a takeover of Danone by the American company
PepsiCo,228 the French Economy Minister announced the publication
of a Decree allowing French authorities to control foreign inward
Id.
Larry Elliot, Chancellor Backs G7 Move to Get Tough on Sovereign Wealth
Funds: 'Political' Investments Not Tolerated, Says Darling: Concerns Grow Over Asset
Power in China and Russia, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/oct/20/1.
225
Michael Harrison, Could Russia’s Gazprom Go for National Grid? It’s Not
Quite As Far-Fetched As It May Seem?, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/michael-harrisonsoutlook-could-russias-gazprom-go-for-national-grid-its-not-quite-as-far-fetchedas-433748.html.
226 Loi 2004-1343 du 9 décembre 2004 de simplification du droit [Law 2004-1343 of
December 9, 2004 on the Simplification of the Law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] 20875 (2004).
227 TFEU, supra note 109, at art. 346.
228 Carol Matlack, Could PepsiCo Digest Danone? , BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, July 20,
2005, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-07-20/could-pepsico-digest-danone.
223
224
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investments in France. Decree 2005-1739 delimits the sectors
concerned and ensures full respect for the EU principle of
proportionality.229 For the purposes of the Decree, an investment is
defined as: (1) acquiring control, within the meaning of Article L.
233-3 of the Commercial Code, a company whose headquarters is in
France; (2) to either directly or indirectly acquire all or part of an
industry of a company whose headquarters is in France; and (3) or
crosses the threshold of 33.33% of direct or indirect ownership of the
capital or voting rights of a company whose headquarters is based
in France.230
Decree 2005-1739 introduces disparate treatment of investments
on the basis of the origin of the investment—i.e., investments of
member states versus third-state investments. The scope of this
authorization procedure is more extensive for investments
originating from third countries—this is possible under Article 64 of
the Treaty—as this measure existed prior to November 30, 1993,
when the Maastricht Treaty came into force.231 However, because
indirect investments are also subject to authorization, the procedure
could also foreseeably create a restriction on investments for thirdstate investments by companies that are legally established in the
EU, but which have shareholders established in third countries.
This difference in treatment, which is permitted by the rules of
the WTO and TFEU Article 64, leads to a continuation of the
previously applicable regime for operations originating in third
countries, but with greater precision in the field of application. For
EU investors, on the other hand, only those operations leading to the
effective transfer of a sensitive activity will be concerned. The
objective is clear: France can oppose the relocation of activities or
product stocks (e.g., vaccines needed in case of a bio-terrorist attack)
essential to its security or defense. Moreover, Decree 2005-1739 sets
out in Article R. 153-1 a clear list of eleven sectors which are
considered strategic, and in which investment can be subject to
229
Décret 2005-1739 du 30 décembre 2005 réglementant les relations financières avec l’étranger et portant application de l’article L. 151-3 (V) du code monétaire et financier [Decree 2005-1739 of December 30, 2005 Regulating Financial Relations with Foreign Countries and Implementing Article L. 151-3 (V) of the
Monetary and Financial Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA République FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] 20779 (2005) [hereinafter Décret 2005-1739]; see also
Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis, supra note 3, at 83.
230 Décret 2005-1739, supra note 230, at art. 1–3.
231
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 1957,
E.T.S.
No.1.
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=URISERV:xy0023.
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authorization.232 The national security rationale for this list is quite
clear, although the Decree has not been formally applied so far.233
After an initial warning,234 the Commission has formally
requested that France amend the Decree to bring it in compliance
with the governing EU treaties as they apply to authorizing
procedures for foreign investments in delineated sectors and
activities that could affect public policy, public security, or national
defense.235 The Commission considers Decree 2005-1739’s restriction
on investment as “incompatible with the free movement of capital
and the freedom of establishment.”236 The formal request sent in
October 2006 signaled the start of an infringement procedure,237
which has not been implemented by the Commission. In substance,
the Commission questioned whether the decree respected the free
circulation of capital and the freedom of establishment within the
EU because it subjects non-EU investors to a more restrictive
approval regime. More precisely, the European Commission
232
See Décret 2005-1739, supra note 230 (listing a total of eleven strategic sectors: money gambling and casino activities; private security services; research, development or production of pathogens or toxic substances for unlawful use or terrorist activities; wire tapping and mail interception equipment; testing and
certification of the security of information technology products and systems; goods
or services related to the information security systems of companies managing critical infrastructure; dual-use (civil and military) items and technologies; cryptology
services; activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets; research, produce or trade in weapons; munitions, and explosive substances intended for military purposes; any business supplying the French defense ministry with any of the
goods or services described above.).
233
See e.g., Ben Hall, Danaher Move for Ingenico Blocked, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21,
2010, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/0bfaefbe-0bc7-11e0-a31300144feabdc0.html#axzz3qDPuL4Kr.
(reporting that the French Government threatened to make use of the 2005 Decree
during an attempted merger between US Danaher and Ingenico, but did not ultimately seek to enforce the Decree).
234
European Commission, Free Movement of Capital: Commission Scrutinises French Law Establishing Authorisation Procedure for Foreign Investments in
Certain Sectors Press Release No. IP/06/438 of 4 April 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-438_en.htm.
235
European Commission, Free Movement of Capital: Commission Calls on
France to Modify Its Legislation Establishing an Authorisation Procedure for Foreign Investments in Certain Sectors of Activity Press Release No. IP/06/1353 of
October 12, 2006 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-061353_en.htm [hereinafter Free Movement of Capital].
236 Id.
237
TFEU, supra note 109, at art. 258; see generally Jan-Krzysztof DuninWasowicz, Note, The Transparency Regulation in Context: A Proxy for Legitimacy or an
Instrument of Regulatory Practice?, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 465 (2010).
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expressed concerns238 which have been ignored by the French
government until now, that some of the provisions in this Decree
could discourage investments from other member states and they
are in contravention of EU Treaty rules on the free movement of
capital (Article 63) and the right of establishment (Article 42). These
additional requirements on European companies owned or
controlled by third state investors would also contravene the
principle of Article 47 (former Article 48), which states that
companies established in member states should be treated as
nationals of such member states.
Article R153-2 “Provisions relating to foreign investments from
third countries” was modified in 2009 and in 2012. The last
amendment, Decree 2014-479, was introduced in May 2014
following the General Electric bid to acquire the energy branch of
Alstom; the media termed this amendment the “Alstom Decree.”239
These amendments detail the requirements for foreign investors
making investments in certain sensitive sectors such as gambling,
private security, telecommunications, IT security, cryptology, and
military and defense. The Alstom Decree further specifes the
business sectors for which the foreign investor is required to attain
governmental approval prior to investing, they are: a) supply of
electricity, gas, oil and other energy resources, b) supply of water in
accordance with public health regulations, c) operation of
transportation networks, d) operation of electronic communications
networks, e) activities specified in the French Defense Code, and f)
protection of public health.240 The Alstom Decree also modified
Article R153-9, making further reference to the French Defense Code
on matters of protection against terrorist threats. 241

Free Movement of Capital, supra note 236.
See Hugh Carnegy, Michael Stothard & Elizabeth Rigby, French ‘Nuclear
Weapon’ Against Foreign Takeovers Sparks UK Blast, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2014, available
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d386c96-dbeb-11e3-a46000144feabdc0.html#axzz3tBBlqgKk.
240 Article R153-2, LEGIFRANCE, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=53EA388BCF910EF7A172A44E421F6E27.tpdila08v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT
000006072026&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006679886&dateTexte=20151202&categorieLien=cid#LEGIARTI
000006679886.
241
See Consolidated Article R153-9 after the 2014 Decree, Articles L. 1332-1
and L. 1332-2 of the Defense Code, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=365ED42A046173DF14F6C081AA5A01CE.tpdila08v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEX
238
239
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6.3. Control of foreign takeovers in Germany
The ownership structure of corporations in the Deutscher Aktien
IndeX (DAX)—a blue chip stock market index comprised of 30 major
German corporations that trade on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange—
demonstrates Germany’s openness to foreign investments,
including those by SWFs. Foreign investors hold stakes in many
DAX companies. In particular, sovereign funds from Kuwait and
Dubai are shareholders in leading DAX companies like Daimler and
However, in Germany there is a growing
Deutsche Bank.242
concern that an SWF could decide to purchase a large German
company such as Deutsche Telecom, Deutsche Bank, or Deutsche
Bahn.243
While the above attest to recognition of the import of national
security in the economic realm, this has not led to further
protectionist measures. Stork reports as of mid-2010 that German
government officials appear troubled by a number of diverse issues
and recent developments, including: (1) the ability of SWFs to
leverage cash to make large acquisitions; (2) a potential indirect
takeover of one of Germany’s largest banks by a foreign
government; (3) state-controlled investors buying small engineering
companies to siphon off intellectual property; and (4) national
security concerns that may arise if parts of the German
infrastructure are acquired by political investors rather than
investors driven by commercial imperatives.244
In 2008, the Cabinet of Germany’s Bundesministerium fur
Wirtschaft und Technologie [Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology] (BMWi) issued a proposed amendment to the
Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung
[Foreign Trade Act and Foreign Trade Regulation] (FTA). The
T000006072026&idArticle=LEGIARTI000028936324&dateTexte=20151202&categorieLien=cid#LEGIARTI
000028936324.
242
Jochen Möbert & Patrick Tydecks, Power and Ownership Structures Among
German Companies: A Network Analysis of Financial Linkages, Darmstadt Technical
University, Institute of Economics (VWL), Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 35974 at 7 (2007).
243
Von Rudzio, Chinesen Wollen Die Deutsche Bahn [Chinese Want the German
Railways],
ZEIT
ONLINE
,
Sept.
10,
2008,
available
at
http://www.zeit.de/2008/37/Macher-und-Maerkte.
244 Florian Stork, A Practical Approach to the New German Foreign Investment Regime–Lessons to be Learnt from Merger Control, GER. L. J. 260 (2010) [hereinafter
Stork].
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amendment, which was subsequently accepted by the German
Parliament,245 is aimed at protecting strategic national industries
from unwanted foreign takeovers. As amended in 2009, the FTA
vests Germany’s federal government with the power to veto any
investment from non-EU or European Free Trade Association
countries246 amounting to 25% or more of a company’s stakes if it
deems that ‘public security’ or ‘public order’ is at risk247.
Based on the US model, Germany’s plans could lead to further
attempts across the across the member states aimed at blocking
foreign investment incursions into sensitive industries.
US
inspiration is obvious in the German pre-notification procedure.
Foreign investors can pre-notify the German administration, on a
voluntary basis, before an intended acquisition. The administration
can then clear the acquisition and provide a level of legal certainty
to the investor. Under Germany’s proposals, ‘public order and
security’ are the principal criteria for triggering a review of foreign
groups’ investment plans.
Within Germany there seems to be a slight contradiction
between private and public interests.
German business
associations— Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag
[Germany’s International Chamber of Commerce as well as the
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie [Federation of German Industries]

(BDI)— did not support the government decision and expressed
doubts as the decision is alleged to go against EU rules on the free
movement of capital.248 The BDI insists that the law is in breach of
245
Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der
Außenwirtschaftsverordnung [Thirteenth Law Amending the Foreign Trade and
Payments Act], April 18, 2009, BGBL. I at 1150 (Ger.), available at
http://www.hohmann-partner.com/rechtsvorschriften/2010/awg_englisch2009.pdf. For a statement from the Ministry of Economy and Technology, see Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie [Fed. Ministry of Econ. and Tech.],
Kabinett beschließt 13. Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und
der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung [Cabinet Approves Thirteenth Act Amending
the Foreign Trade Act and Foreign Trade Regulation], Aug. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=266018.html (acceptance of the amendment). For analysis of the Act,
see generally Stork, supra note 245.
246
The European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) is comprised of Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
247
Thirteenth Law Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, Apr. 18,
2009, Section 7 § 1 Article 4, available at http://www.hohmann-partner.com/rechtsvorschriften/2010/awg_englisch-2009.pdf.
248
Germany Moves to Protect Companies from Foreign Takeovers, DEUTSCHE
WELLE, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http://www.dw.com/en/germany-moves-to-
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EU Treaty rules on the free movement of capital (Article 63) and the
right of establishment (Article 42), which it interprets as being
equally applicable to EU and non-EU investors. The BDI further
argues that the FTA’s definition of national security is too broad.249
In 2014, Michael Glos, Germany’s Economics Minister, insisted
that the mechanism would be used only in “extremely rare” cases250
and that “Germany is and remains open to [foreign] investors.”251
The government further argues that the law merely brings Germany
into line with existing legislation in France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.252 In other words, just as other countries have
already done, Germany is creating governmental means of
oversight for few exceptional cases and to rule out a possible threat
to national security interests. Investment protectionism or an
overall rejection of investments by sovereign funds, now and in the
future, will not and cannot occur in Germany.
7. CONCLUSION
The European Commission expected member states to strongly
signal their readiness to take joint action to avoid a repeat of the
financial turmoil that hit the global economy after the US mortgage
crisis in summer 2007. As the current financial turmoil of 2008–2009
demonstrated, financial liquidity is vital for Western economies.253
We have recently witnessed how firms on both sides of the
Atlantic— e.g., Barclays and Citibank—have sought out sovereign
funds. Investments by SWFs were needed to allow these companies
protect-companies-from-foreign-takeovers/a-3580978 (reporting on Germany’s International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) decision to defend the view that “[f]oreign
investment brings many advantages such as economic growth, employment and as
a result rising living standards” and The Federation of German Industry (BDI) saying that German law would send “the wrong signal for Germany as a place to invest”).
249 Id.
250 Bertrand Benoit, Berlin Foreign Investors’ Bill Clears Hurdles, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac2762d6-6eff-11dd-a80a0000779fd18c.html#axzz3qDPuL4Kr.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See Brendan J. Reed, Note, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbarians at the
Gate? Analysis of the Legal and Business Implications of their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. &
Bus. REV. 97, 103 (2009) (discussing how sovereign wealth funds affect liquidity and
thus affect the secondary market).
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to fulfill their strategic aims and, as a result, attitudes towards SWFs
shifted sharply in 2008. Whereas SWFs had been initially greeted
with outright suspicion, they ultimately became a pre-eminent
source of global capital in the post-crisis era.
However, SWFs have yet to take great strides in purchasing EU
strategic assets. For example, Russian SWFs have not attempted to
buy into any strategic assets; instead, they have taken very limited
stakes in companies. Even this action piques the curiosity of the
European Commission and the member state governments. But
there is no evidence at the moment that these SWFs are being used
for any nefarious purpose. Of course, it cannot be ignored that
national security is a potentially crucial concern, even when the
proposed buyer is a private company (e.g., where the state and the
private sector are heavily intertwined in the buyer’s home state).
SWFs are not newcomers to the investment scene; rather, they
have been investing in Europe for decades.254 SWFs, as responsible
and reliable investors, have pursued a long-term and stable policy
towards investment that has stood the test of time during the Global
Financial Crisis. Moreover, these funds provided capital just when
it was most desperately needed during the initial stages of the crisis.
Given the aforementioned, investing countries may well be entitled
to seek the best way to invest their reserves in foreign currency.
Overall, SWFs improve the liquidity of the financial markets and
create growth and jobs. They also contribute to investment for the
longer term and create stability for the companies in which they
invest.
Over the years, the free movement of capital has contributed to
growth in the Common Market and in other markets around the
world. Thus, it is important that the EU does not adopt policies that
may endanger market stability in the future, such as overregulation
and protectionism. Instead, it should abide by free market
principles. Hence, two clear conclusions can be drawn at this stage.
254
See, e.g., Interview with the Head of the Kuwait Investment Authority: We Are
Being Punished, DER SPIEGEL, May 19, 2008, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/spiegel-interview-with-the-head-of-the-kuwait-investmentauthority-we-are-being-punished-a-554042.html (reporting that the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)—one of the oldest and richest SWFs, has been a major shareholder of the German car manufacturer Daimler since 1974); see also Jim Henry, Abu
Dhabi Becomes Biggest Daimler Shareholder, CBS NEWS, Mar. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abu-dhabi-becomes-biggest-daimler-shareholder/ (noting that the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the State of Kuwait are the biggest shareholders of German car manufacturer Daimler, with equity stakes of 9.1%
and 6.9%, respectively).
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First, it appears that a new wave of protectionism against foreign
ownership represents a reinvigoration of protectionism from years
past. Second, any domestic or EU regulation would undermine any
message that the EU (or individual member states) is a good place
to invest. Europe must remain an attractive place for investment.
SWFs are the by-products of increasing globalization and of the
benefits of international trade. Thus far, they have only proved to
be good shareholders. They are interested in the long-term, positive
development of their business and, as a result, also interested in
obtaining a good, long-term rate of return on their investments. The
EU should, therefore, continue to allow SWFs to invest in the
Common Market.
These funds can, however, pose threats and both the types of
investments they are making and whether those investments meet
the transparency requirements should be scrutinized. Without
continued inward investment, the EU economy will stagnate. The
EU has no interest in erecting barriers to investment and it considers
sovereign investment as an important engine for worldwide
economic growth. If the EU were to restrict the activities of SWFs
within the European borders, it might find itself at an economic
disadvantage, with significant investment dollars going to other
parts of the world. There is a risk of seeing a strategy being
implemented in each of the member states that, ultimately, would
not help to tackle the reality. There is a need to clarify, at the
European level, which sectors should be protected from foreign
takeovers beyond the vague criteria of public order and public
security, as enunciated. Such a list of EU strategic sectors could, and
in fact should, be drafted so that energy, technologies, and other
relevant sectors are set apart from the regulation of sectors subject
to competition regulation. In addition, public mistrust of overseas
investment and isolationist sentiment could cause an overreaction
to the question of regulation. This could have far-reaching
consequences not only financially, but also in terms of diplomatic
and economic relationships with other nations. For example,
European leaders have not adopted different policies when dealing
with Russia as from when they are dealing with the United States.
To this extent, there is a need to clarify the interpretation of Article
65 TFEU, which provides for restrictions on the free movement of
capital on the grounds of public order. Although never employed
vis-à-vis SWFs, it is worthwhile ensuring that member states will not
be tempted to make extensive use of it.
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